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Little is known about how investors select socially responsible investment (SRI) funds. Investors in 
SRI funds may care more about social or ethical issues in their investment decisions than about fund 
performance. This paper studies the money-flows into and out of the SRI funds around the world. 
We find that ethical money chases past returns. In contrast to conventional funds’ investors, SRI 
investors care less about the funds’ riskiness and fees. Funds characterized by shareholder activism 
and by in-house SRI research attract more stable investors. Membership of a large SRI fund family 
creates higher flow volatility due to the lower fees to reallocate money within the fund family. SRI 
funds receiving most of the money-inflows perform worse in the future, which is consistent with 
theories of decreasing returns to scale in the mutual fund industry. Finally, funds employing a higher 
number of SRI screens to model their investment universe receive larger money-inflows and perform 
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 “Invest with your brain and heart. Invest for our planet… The Funds give investors the ability to 
unite their financial goals with environmental progress” 
           -- from the prospectus of Sierra Club Funds  
 
Particular to the socially responsible investment (SRI) funds, often also more narrowly 
called ethical funds, is that both financial goals and social objectives are pursued. Over the past 
decade, these SRI funds experienced a tremendous growth in most developed economies around the 
world.1 SRI comprises assets under management worth $2.1 trillion, representing approximately 
11% of the total assets under professional management in the US (Social Investment Forum, 2003).2  
This paper studies the money-flows into and out of the SRI mutual funds around the world. 
Some recent studies on the behavior of investors in mutual funds show that both financial and non-
financial fund attributes affect the choice of a particular mutual fund or hedge fund. Risk-adjusted as 
well as raw past performance significantly affect the money-flows of mutual funds (see, e.g. 
Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Goetzmann and Peles, 1997; Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Del Guercio and 
Tkac, 2002). While the top performing mutual funds attract most of the inflows, the weakly 
performing funds are hardly affected by outflows. This indicates that once money is invested, it tends 
to be rather sticky (Gruber, 1996). Furthermore, non-financial attributes like mutual fund visibility 
(Sirri and Tufano, 1998) and mutual fund advertising (Jain and Wu, 1999) have a significant impact 
on the money-flows to mutual funds. For hedge funds similar results are reported by Agarwal, Daniel 
and Naik (2004).   
In spite of the fact that SRI has become a multi-trillion dollar market, little is known about 
how investors select funds with explicit non-financial attributes.3 Investors in SRI mutual funds may 
                                                 
1 The terms SRI funds and ethical funds are often used interchangeably, although strictly speaking ethical 
funds are a subset of SRI funds. The latter comprise funds whose investment universe is confined by 
environmental, ethical, corporate governance or social screens. Ethical screens are based on a specific ideology 
or religion. For example, “The investment objective of the Ave Maria Catholic Values Fund is to seek long-
term capital appreciation from equity investments in companies that do not violate the core values and 
teachings of the Roman Catholic Church.” 
2 The quality of data on the institutional SRI market (i.e. the SRI assets under professional management by 
pension funds, insurance companies, etc.) is poor and does not allow a thorough analysis. 
3 Most of the existing empirical studies on SRI focus on fund performance. For instance, Hamilton, Joe and 
Statman (1993) and Statman (2000) study US SRI funds; Luther, Matatko and Corner (1992) and Gregory, 
Matatko and Luther (1997) examine UK SRI funds; Bauer, Derwall and Otten (2003) study Canadian SRI 
funds; Bauer, Otten and Tourani Rad (2004) analyze Australian SRI funds; and Kreander, Gray, Power and 
Sinclair (2005) and Bauer, Koedijk and Otten (2005) examine international SRI funds. These studies suggest 
that the average risk-adjusted returns of SRI mutual funds do not differ significantly from the average 
performance of non-SRI mutual funds. Using a Bayesian approach, Geczy, Stambaugh and Levin (2003) show 
that the fund selection process of ethical investors determines the performance of the SRI funds relative to a 
conventional portfolio. 
 3
care more about ethical, social, environmental, or corporate governance aspects in their investment 
decisions and pay less attention to past fund performance.   
In addition to the fact that we study the behavior of investors around the world who 
explicitly care about non-financial investment screens in portfolio selection, and that we hence 
contribute to the typology and geographical scope of mutual fund research, we make the following 
contributions to the literature.  First, we study the determinants of money-flows in the SRI fund 
industry in a multivariate framework. To our best knowledge, Bollen and Cohen (2005) wrote the 
only study on this issue, but concentrated on a univariate analysis of money-flows and past returns 
for US SRI funds. In contrast, we analyze the question whether or not investors chase past returns, 
while we study simultaneously other dimensions of the SRI decision: fund size, age, risk, the fee 
structure and the reputation of fund families. In addition, investors may evaluate a fund’s 
performance relative to other funds in their home country (Sirri and Tufano, 1998), and consider 
trends in past performance (Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). This emphasizes the importance to 
study the determinants of money-flows in a multivariate framework.  
Second, we examine the determinants of the volatility of money-flows of SRI funds. Massa 
(2003) states that a high volatility of flows suggests that the funds’ investors are myopic in making 
investment decisions, whereas low flow volatility implies that investors have longer investment 
horizons. Bollen and Cohen (2005) document that, in the US, the flow volatility is lower in SRI 
funds than in non-SRI funds. We contribute to this line of research by relating flow volatility to past 
performance and various fund characteristics.  
Third, we investigate whether or not money-flows can predict future fund performance. Berk 
and Green (2004) introduce a Bayesian model in which rational investors use past performance to 
update their information on managerial ability. According to this model, investors chase past 
performance which explains the strong money-flows to the best performing funds. However, if fund 
managers face decreasing returns to scale, money-flows into the better performing funds may reduce 
future abnormal returns. In that case, we would not expect performance persistence. Specifically, we 
investigate whether or not the SRI funds receiving more inflows will perform better in the future, and 
how future performance depends on fund characteristics and the type of SRI screens employed. Put 
differently, we ask the question whether ‘ethical’ money is financially smart.  
Fourth, related to this question is our analysis of the impact of various types of SRI screens 
on SRI fund flows and performance. As mentioned above, investors may derive utility from 
investing in companies implementing corporate policies which are congruent with the investors’ 
social or ethical concerns. The fact that SRI screens constrain the investment universe may influence 
fund performance. In spite of the fact that SRI screens play a central role in the SRI fund industry, 
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the existing research on SRI funds has not yet investigated the impact of screens on flows and future 
performance. The analysis of the predictive power of money-flows and the use of screening activity 
to generate superior returns (the above issues three and four) enable us to answer the question 
whether or not ethical money is financially smart.  
The main findings of our paper can be summarized as follows. First, SRI funds with better 
past returns or higher return rankings attract higher money-inflows, whereas the flow-performance 
relation is weaker when past performance has been poor. In line with Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1998), SRI investors direct more money to funds exhibiting persistence of good performance. These 
results imply that SRI investors chase past performance and that they are more sensitive to good than 
to poor past performance. In addition, we demonstrate that higher inflows arise in SRI funds that are 
smaller, younger or are members of large fund families. The latter result may reflect the impact of 
fund family reputation but also the fact that investors are usually allowed to switch at low cost to 
other funds of the family. In contrast to conventional investors, SRI investors are not sensitive to past 
risks nor to the fund fees (i.e. management fees and load fees), which may encourage fund 
management companies to enter the SRI niche.  
Second, the flow volatility of SRI funds is higher when past returns have been strong and is 
higher for smaller and younger SRI funds with higher risk and lower fees. In addition, the volatility 
increases when the funds belong to a large fund family, when this family is the domestic market 
leader, and when the family includes a top performing fund. We also document that funds 
characterized by shareholder activism and by in-house SRI research attract more stable investors.  
Third, the future performance of SRI funds is worse when these funds attract more money-
flows, or when they are larger. A two-standard deviation shock in average money-flows yields –
4.6% abnormal returns (annually) in the future. It suggests that, by reallocating across different SRI 
funds, individual investors reduce their wealth. Our finding is consistent with the theories 
formulating the decreasing returns to scale in mutual fund industry (Berk and Green, 2004).  
Fourth, screening intensity matters: funds with more SRI screens attract more money-flows 
and have better returns in the future although funds concentrating on environmental and ethical (c.q. 
religious or ideological) issues generate lower future returns. Consequently, the question ‘Is ethical 
money financially smart’ receives a nuanced answer. SRI investors chase past returns and they are 
not able to select funds that will generate superior performance. Still, high SRI screening intensity 
yields higher future performance than focused funds.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I gives the institutional 
background of the SRI mutual fund industry. In Section II we discuss the methodology and introduce 
the data. Sections III and IV examine the determinants of money-flows and flow volatility, 
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respectively. Section V focuses on the relation between money-flows and future fund performance, 
and Section VI concludes.   
 
I. Institutional Background 
 
Modern ethical investing roots in the growing social awareness of investors over the past 
decades.4 As SRI investors have diverse social objectives, SRI funds usually employ a combination 
of negative or positive SRI screens in the process of constructing portfolios. A typical negative 
screen is applied to an initial asset pool, such as S&P 500 stocks from which specific sectors (i.e. 
alcohol, tobacco and defense industries) are excluded. Positive screens are employed to select 
companies meeting superior standards on issues such as corporate governance or environmental 
protection. The use of positive screens is often combined with a ‘best in class’ approach: firms are 
ranked within each industry based on social criteria; subsequently, only those firms passing a 
minimum threshold in each industry are selected as potential candidates for inclusion into a portfolio. 
For instance, the chemical firms polluting least are selected as candidates for SRI portfolios. 
Moreover, SRI funds often engage in shareholder activism, where fund managers attempt to 
influence the company’s actions through direct dialogue with the management or by voting at annual 
general meetings. SIF (2003) reports that, in 2002, SRI investors in the US filed 292 shareholder 
resolutions on ethical, social or environmental issues.  
It is also important to denote that mutual fund managers generally have different objectives 
than funds’ investors. The former are mainly interested in money-inflows and the resulting 
management fees, while the latter desire high risk-adjusted returns at low fees. Furthermore, fund 
investors are not formally trained in portfolio analysis, and their investment decision is influenced by 
the marketing efforts of investment funds and by the media attention the funds receive (Sirri and 
Tufano, 1998). Consequently, mutual fund managers may implement strategies that enhance their 
own revenues but are not in the best interest of the funds’ investors. These conflicts of interests may 
induce excessive risk-taking by the fund managers (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997).5 Given that the 
                                                 
4 Traditional SRI investing has religious origins. The first modern ethical mutual fund, the Pax World Fund, 
was founded in 1971 in the US. Created for investors opposed to the Vietnam War (and militarism in general), 
the fund avoided investments in weapons contractors. In the 1980s, the concerns about the racist system of 
apartheid in South Africa became a focal point of ethical investors. SRI investors urged funds not to include 
South-African firms nor western firms with South-African subsidiaries into their portfolios. Since the early 
1990s, issues like environmental protection, human rights, and labor relations have become common in the 
investment screens of SRI funds. Furthermore, a series of corporate scandals has turned corporate governance 
and responsibility into a focal point of SRI investors. 
5 In terms of governance, there are important differences between a mutual fund and a corporation. Tufano and 
Sevick (1997) state that the fund’s board of directors oversees the fund management and represents the 
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sales of funds’ shares to new shareholders require high marketing expenses, the growth in fund 
assets does not necessarily generate value for the incumbent shareholders (Sirri and Tufano, 1998). 
Massa (2003) finds that the degree of product differentiation negatively affects fund performance, 
but fund families have incentives to invent new funds because ‘the more fund families are able to 
differentiate themselves in terms of non-performance-related characteristics, the less they need to 
compete in terms to performance’. Khorana and Servaes (2004) confirm that product innovation 
generates business if the new fund is more differentiated from the existing funds and is in a specific 
niche.  
SRI funds differ from conventional mutual funds in several ways. First, SRI funds employ 
SRI screens that restrict their investment opportunity set. The exclusion of companies based on 
social, environmental, corporate governance or ethical screens may reduce the diversification 
possibilities and negatively influence the performance of the SRI funds in comparison to 
conventional funds. Alternatively, the use of investment screens can also be regarded as an active 
selection strategy of firms with characteristics that are believed to yield superior performance. They 
are used as filters to determine e.g. managerial competence, superior corporate governance etc. 
(Bollen and Cohen, 2005). Second, investors in SRI funds may also derive non-financial utility by 
investing in companies adopting specific social, environmental or ethical policies which correspond 
to these investors’ concerns. For example, an investor who feels committed to protecting the 
environment may decide not to invest in companies causing high pollution, even though such 
companies may provide interesting investment opportunities in terms of risk-return tradeoff. 
Consequently, SRI funds may attract specific types of investors. For example, Beal and Goyen 
(1998) report that SRI funds’ investors in Australia are more likely to be female, older, and more 
highly educated than the investors investing in the whole universe of stocks listed on the Australian 
Stock Exchange. Bollen and Cohen (2005) report similar evidence for the US. To the extent that the 
types of investors in SRI funds are different from those investing in conventional funds, the 
determinants of the money-flows into and out of SRI funds and conventional funds may also differ. 
Third, over the past decade, national governments in Europe and elsewhere passed regulations 
                                                                                                                                                      
interests of shareholders. However, this board is not elected by the fund’s shareholders but is elected by the 
fund management company. Even the independent directors are elected by the fund management company and 
serve on many funds of the same company. In addition, the fund’s board has little contact with the fund’s 
shareholders and is not required to hold annual meetings. It is also very rare that the boards remove 
underperforming fund managers. Finally, mutual fund shareholders have little or no bargaining power to set the 
fund management’s compensation.  
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regarding social and environmental investments and savings, which had a positive impact on the 
growth of the SRI mutual fund industry.6  
Given the above differences between SRI and conventional mutual funds, it is interesting to 
investigate the determinants of money-flows in the SRI fund industry, and the relation between 
money-flows and future fund performance. In the following section we will discuss our data and 
research methodology.  
 
II. Data and Methodology 
 
A. Sample Selection 
 
In order to examine the determinants of the money-flows in the SRI mutual fund industry 
around the world, we construct a database that contains socially responsible equity mutual funds 
domiciled in 17 countries and 4 offshore jurisdictions7. We gather data on SRI funds from: (i) 
Europe (excluding the UK), more specifically: from Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland, (ii) the UK, including Guernsey and the 
Isle of Man, (iii) the US, and (iv) the Rest of the World, more specifically: Australia, Cayman 
Islands, Japan, Malaysia, the Netherlands Antilles, Singapore, and South Africa. We also collect data 
on conventional equity mutual funds in the UK, which serve as our reference group. Our primary 
data source is the Standard & Poors’ Fund Service (Micropal). For each fund, the database contains 
monthly Net Asset Value8 (NAV), monthly Assets Under Management (AUM), and other fund 
characteristics such as the management fees, load fees and the inception date. Our sample period 
extends from January 1992 to December 2003. We focus on this period for two reasons: first, the 
number of SRI mutual funds prior to our sample period is tiny. Second, prior to 1992, the AUM in 
the S&P database is recorded on a quarterly basis rather than on a monthly one.  
                                                 
6 Since the early 1990s, the German and Dutch governments have granted tax advantages to investments in 
renewable energy. In the UK, the Amendment to the 1995 Pensions Act came into force in 2000 and required 
the trustees of occupational pension funds in the UK to disclose in the Statement of Investment Principles “the 
extent (if at all) to which social, environmental and ethical considerations are taken into account in the 
selection, retention and realization of investments”. Since 2001, Australia, Belgium, Germany, Italy and 
Sweden, have passed similar regulations regarding the disclosure of the extent to which pension funds adopt 
SRI screens in their investment decisions. 
7 We collect data on socially responsible mutual funds for 26 countries and 4 offshore jurisdictions. However, 
because monthly data on assets under management of funds are not available for five countries, we exclude the 
funds domiciled in Canada, Finland, Hong Kong (China), Norway and Spain. The four offshore jurisdictions 
included in our sample are the Cayman Islands, Guernsey, the Isle of Man, and the Netherlands Antilles. 
8 The Net Asset Value is defined as the per share value of a fund’s portfolio. The NAV in the S&P database is 
net of annual management fees, inclusive of any distributions and denoted in local currency. 
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To determine the universe of SRI funds, we create a list of mutual funds, domiciled in 21 
countries and offshore jurisdictions, which bear labels such as  ‘ethical’, ‘socially responsible’, 
‘ecology’, ‘Christian value’ or ‘Islamic’ in the Standard & Poors’ Fund Service database. S&P 
classifies mutual funds as ethical or socially responsible investment funds if the fund managers 
specify in the fund prospectuses that they have social, environmental or ethical investment goals.  
Our sample includes a small number of religious funds. These funds typically employ 
traditional, negative SRI screens such as the exclusion of tobacco and alcohol-producing firms 
combined with screens based on religious convictions, such as avoiding insurance companies 
covering non-married couples (e.g. by some US Christian funds) or avoiding pork producers (e.g. by 
Islamic funds).  
When a mutual fund is sold in two or more countries, the S&P list of socially responsible 
funds reports it as two or more funds. To avoid the double accounting of AUM, we exclude such 
duplicated records.  For the same reason, we exclude multiple share classes for a given fund if the 
total AUM across all share classes is reported rather than the AUM of the individual share classes. 
The above procedure reduces our sample size from the starting sample of 1,343 funds to 718 socially 
responsible mutual funds issued all around the world.  
We subsequently verify the SRI screening policies of these funds. We first develop a list of 
SRI screens used by SRI funds around the world. Combining the information from a variety of data 
resources9, we identify 21 screening criteria, which are further classified into four major categories. 
Table 1 reports the four main categories and the underlying screens. The first category, denoted as 
‘Sin’, contains funds that avoid investing in firms from the so-called ‘sin-industries’, which produce 
e.g. tobacco, alcohol, or weapons. The funds in the ‘Ethical’ category exclude e.g. firms that test 
their products on animals, produce equipment facilitating abortion, develop genetic-modified 
products, or violate Islamic or Christian principals. Funds that employ screens checking for superior 
corporate governance, good labor relations or a good human rights track record (e.g. no child labor) 
are denoted as ‘Social’ funds. Finally, funds that avoid utilities operating nuclear power plants or that 
invest in environmentally friendly firms are referred to as ‘Environmental’ funds. Note that an SRI 
fund usually employs a combination of screens from several categories. For instance, the TIAA-
CREF Social Choice Equity Fund excludes companies that derive any revenues from alcohol, 
tobacco, gambling or weapons, and invests in companies meeting high standards in labor relations, 
corporate governance, environmental performance. For each fund in our initial sample, we hand-
                                                 
9 Our information sources are Social Investment Forum (2003), Natural Capital Institute 
(www.responsibleinvesting.org), SiRi SRI Fund Service (www.avanzi-sri.org), and Sustainable Investment 
Platform (www.sustainable-investment.org).  
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collect and verify the information on social screens using the fund prospectuses and websites, and 
gather in many cases more information by direct contact with fund managers (by phone, by email or 
via on-site interviews). Furthermore, we also collect information on whether a fund engages in 
shareholder activism and whether the fund bases its screening activities on an in-house SRI research 
team. Hence, the mutual funds we accept as SRI funds employ at least one of the above screens as 
part of their investment policy.  
Consistent with prior studies on the money-flows of mutual funds, we restrict our sample to 
equity mutual funds, excluding fixed-income, balanced, and money-market mutual funds. We also 
do not include funds that are not available to individual investors directly, but are only available 
through institutions such as pension funds, insurance companies, or charities and foundations. The 
above process results in a sample of 461 equity SRI funds. Finally, after dropping the funds for 
which data on assets under management are not available, our final sample of SRI funds comprises 
410 equity mutual funds domiciled in 21 countries or offshore jurisdictions around the world. Our 
benchmark sample of conventional funds consists of 649 non-SRI equity mutual funds in the UK. 
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
 
The cross-sectional characteristics of the equity SRI fund industry across countries as 
captured by our sample are described in Table 2. We identify a mutual fund’s nationality by its legal 
domicile. It should be noted that the domicile may be different from the countries where the funds 
are sold. For funds in the four offshore jurisdictions, the investors’ nationalities are unobservable. 
Another extreme case is Luxemburg, funds of which are sold across Europe. Fund managers choose 
Luxemburg and offshore jurisdictions as their domiciles mainly because of favourable tax laws. 10  
Table 2 reports the number of funds, the number of fund families (i.e. the financial 
institution that issue mutual funds), the average and median age of funds, and the average and 
median assets under management per fund for our sample of SRI and non-SRI funds in December 
2003. The largest number of SRI funds in our sample comes from Europe excluding the UK (in total 
182 funds, part of 100 different fund families), followed by the US (93 funds), the UK (49 funds), 
                                                 
10 In the analysis of Section III, we use the following rules to identify the nationality of funds domiciled in 
Luxemburg and the four offshore jurisdictions: based on the countries of origin of their fund management 
companies, we assign 41 out of the 55 funds domiciled in Luxemburg to: Switzerland (11 funds), Germany 
(10), UK (6), France (4), Netherlands (4), Belgium (3), Sweden (2), and Austria (1). Funds domiciled in 
Guernsey and Isle of Man are assigned to the UK group; funds domiciled in Cayman Islands and Netherlands 
Antilles are considered a separate group. Identifying a fund’s nationality is necessary when ranking a fund 
relative to other funds in the same country. The construction of most of the indicator variables in Section III, 
including D(Young), D(High Costs), D(Top Performer Family), D(Market Leader Family), D( Persistent 
Winner), D(Persistent Loser) and D(Loser to Winner), and the Rank Quintiles variables, involves the above 
process.  
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and Australia (36 funds). The SRI fund industry of the UK and the US is the most mature as 
reflected by the median age of about 7 years, whereas the industry in Europe (excluding the UK) and 
the Rest of the World is young with a median age of about 3 years since the fund’s inception. 
Furthermore, the US and UK SRI funds are much larger than those in Europe and the Rest of the 
World. While the average size of SRI funds in the US is  142 million, in Europe (excluding the UK) 
the average size is  32 million. In terms of total assets under management, the US has the largest 
SRI mutual equity funds industry, which manages assets of  13.2 billion. By contrast, the total 
assets managed by SRI funds in all the other countries amount to  13.0 billion. Finally, Panel B of 
Table 2 shows that, the reference group of non-SRI funds in the UK is much older and larger, with a 
median age of 10 years and an average size of  270 million per fund. While an SRI fund family 
manages on average 2 SRI equity funds, the average number of non-SRI equity funds per family in 
the UK is 5 funds. 
As the S&P’s Fund Service does not maintain data on funds that cease to exist, we 
investigate whether or not our sample of SRI funds suffers from survivorship bias. While most 
papers of the SRI literature report that there is no fund attrition11, we learnt from discussions with 
several industry experts and fund managers that over our sample period eight socially responsible 
equity mutual funds12 ceased to exist. Given the very low attrition rate (on average 0.25% on an 
annual basis), it is unlikely that survivorship bias will affect our results. Moreover, the flow-
performance relation of conventional funds is not sensitive to fund attrition either. Chevalier and 
Ellison (1997), Goetzmann and Peles (1997) and Sirri and Tufano (1998) perform their analyses on a 
survivorship-bias free sample and find no difference in results for samples not corrected for fund 
attrition. 
 
B. Summary Statistics 
 
                                                 
11  Statman (2000) reports that none of the socially responsible mutual funds in the US have disappeared in the 
sample period of 1990-1998. Schroder (2004) documents that no SRI funds have been closed in the US, 
Germany and Switzerland for the sample period of 1990-2002. Similarly, Geczy, Stambaugh and Levin (2003), 
Bauer, Koedijk and Otten (2005) and Bollen and Cohen (2005) also do not report on the existence of dead SRI 
funds in the US, UK and Germany for their sample periods, although they do capture the attrition of 
conventional mutual funds when creating a reference group. 
12 The eight ‘dead’ equity SRI funds are: ‘Cruelty Free Value Fund’, ‘Friends Ivory European Social 
Awareness Fund’, ‘Neuberger Berman Socially Responsive Assets Fund’, ‘North American Funds: Socially 
Responsible’, ‘NPI Social Index Tracker Fund’, ‘Rightime Fund: Social Awareness Fund’, ‘Stratton Special 
Value Fund’, and ‘Victory Funds: LakeFront Fund’. We collect data for these funds from a number of sources 
including CRSP Survivor-Bias Free Mutual Fund Database and Datastream ‘dead’ mutual funds research files. 
Including data of the dead funds into analysis doesn’t affect our results (both the coefficient estimates and 
significance levels). 
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Fund flows are defined as the net change in fund assets beyond reinvested dividends. As in 












Flow      (1) 
 
where AUMi,t and AUMi,t-1 are the assets under management (in local currency) for fund i at the end 
of month t and month t-1, Returni,t is the raw return for fund i during month t, defined as the 
difference in the natural logarithms of net asset values of fund i at the end of month t and month t-1. 
The returns are net of annual management fees, inclusive of any distributions and denoted in local 
currency. This measure of fund flows assumes that all flows occur at the end of month t.13  
Figure 1 shows the number of SRI funds and their total assets under management over time. 
Our dataset shows that the number of SRI equity funds around the world has grown rapidly to 410 in 
just one decade, and that the total AUM has augmented from  1.7 billion in December 1992 to  
26.2 billion by December 2003. Europe (excluding the UK) has experienced the highest growth in 
the number of SRI funds, while the country with the fastest growth in SRI assets in equity mutual 
funds is the US. In order to have an impression of the relation between past performance and money-
flows, we depict in Figure 2 the average annual flows against the prior-year’s average annual returns. 
Although the average return of SRI funds around the world was strongly negative in 2001 and 2002, 
i.e. –16% and –21% respectively, the SRI fund industry still experienced a strong inflow of new 
money of 41% and 38% in these two years. Figure 2 also suggests that, although in almost all years 
the average flows are positive, they seem to depend on the recent returns of SRI funds for all four 
regions. 
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 and Table 3 about here] 
 
Table 3 presents the summary statistics over the sample period 1992–2003. Panel A of Table 
3 reports the average and standard deviation of money-flows, the returns, the flow volatility 
(measured in 12-month rolling windows), the risk (the standard deviation of returns in 12-month 
rolling windows), the fund size (the natural logarithm of fund assets in ), the total fees (the sum of 
                                                 
13 To reduce the effect of outliers, we remove the observations of fund flows beyond the 99.5th percentile or 
below the 0.5th percentile. This is similar to other studies of fund flows such as Barber, Odean and Zheng 
(2005) and Bollen and Cohen (2005).  
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the annual management fee and one seventh of the load fees14), the number of funds per fund family, 
the fraction of funds investing in particular geographical areas, and the number of SRI screens used 
per fund. The statistics are computed over time and across funds. Panel A shows that the SRI 
industry has experienced a strong growth all over the world with the average monthly growth rate 
ranging from 2.7% in the UK to 3.6% in the US. The average fund size is the largest in the UK. 
Furthermore, the average annual total fees range from 1.7% in Europe (excluding the UK) to 2.1% in 
the Rest of the World. There are important differences in the components of fund fees across regions: 
SRI funds in the US have the highest average management fee of 1.6% per year and the lowest load 
fees (defined as the sum of front- and back-end fees), namely 1.8%. The load fees are the highest in 
the Rest of the World, on average 4%. European SRI funds are the most internationally diversified 
ones: 33% of the funds invest across Europe, 61% invest around the world and only 6% invest in the 
domestic country. In contrast, only 16% of the SRI funds in the US invest overseas. Finally, Panel B 
shows that our benchmark non-SRI funds in the UK have experienced 1.9% less money-inflows per 
month than the SRI funds, in spite of the fact that the average monthly return of non-SRI funds is 
0.5% higher. This suggests that the strong growth of the SRI industry is not merely driven by returns, 
and that non-financial investment attributes may play an important role in attracting investors.  
 Panel C highlights the differences in screening activity across the four regions. In the UK 
SRI funds employ on average about 9.5 investment screens simultaneously, 6 of which are so-called 
negative screens which exclude firms or industries with undesirable ethical characteristics. In 
contrast, SRI funds in the Rest of the World apply on average 5.5 screens. Negative screens are 
employed by more than 97% of SRI funds in the US. In particular, 93% of US SRI funds use at least 
one of the Sin screens, including tobacco, alcohol, gambling, weapons and pornography. In contrast, 
social and environmental screens are more popular in the UK and the rest of Europe (used by 87% 
and 92% of the funds, respectively). It should be noted that Islamic funds account for 36% of SRI 
funds in the Rest of the World, which includes Asia-Pacific and Africa. Interestingly, 47% of the US 
SRI funds report that they make active use of their shareholder voting rights, while in Europe 
(excluding the UK) only 18% of the funds are involved in shareholder activism. Finally, 55% of the 
US SRI funds base their SRI screening activities on in-house research, compared to only 11% of SRI 
funds in the Rest of the World.  
                                                 
14 Load fees include front-end fees (share subscription fees) and back-end fees (share redemption fees). We 
amortized loads fees over a seven-year holding period, which is the average holding period for equity mutual 
funds. While load fees are mainly used to pay for trading costs and marketing expenses (e.g. distribution 
payments to brokers or advertising), management fees are used to cover operating expenses including 
managerial compensation as well as part of the marketing expenses (called the 12B1 fee in the US). Like Sirri 
and Tufano (1998), Total Fees captures the total fees charged to investors.  
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III. The Determinants of Money-Flows 
 
A. Flows and Past Performance 
 
Although prior research on mutual fund performance reports little evidence of 
outperformance by conventional funds and of persistence in performance (see, e.g. Carhart, 1997), 
there is strong evidence that investors chase funds with high historical performance. As stated by 
Sirri and Tufano (1998), individual investors tend to use rudimentary performance measures like raw 
historical returns to select mutual funds. Berk and Green (2004) state that considering past 
performance may be justified provided that fund managers possess differential stock-picking 
abilities. For these reasons, we include past performance in our model explaining the funds’ money-
flows. Investors may also consider other factors in addition to past performance: fund size and age, 
its return volatility, the fee structure, past money-flows and the reputation of the fund family. All this 
information is readily available to investors through newspapers, websites and specialized data 
providers, such as Morningstar or S&P. In addition, investors of SRI funds may value the use of 
screens used by SRI funds. Some investors may particularly care about pure ethical issues such as 
animal tests or genetic engineering, whereas others may give priority to social responsibility or good 
corporate governance. 
Therefore, we examine the determinants of SRI fund flows around the world and of our 
benchmark funds (the conventional (non-SRI) UK mutual equity funds), by estimating the following 
regression:   
 
Flowi,t = β0 + β1 Average Returni,[t-1,t-12] + β2 Average Returni,[t-1,t-12] * D(Negative Returni,[t-
1,t-12])+ β3 Average Returni,[t-13,t-24]+ β4 Average Returni,[t-13,t-24] * D(Negative Returni,[t-13,t-24])+  
Control Variablesi,t-1  + ui,t         (2) 
 
where Flowi,t is the money-flow of fund i in month t, Average Returni,[t-1,t-12] and Average Returni,[t-
13,t-24] are the average returns of fund i over the months t-1 to t-12 and t-13 to t-24, D(Negative 
Returni,[t-1,t-12]) and D(Negative Returni,[t-13,t-24]) are indicator variables that are equal to one if  
Average Returni,[t-1,t-12] and Average Returni,[t-13,t-24] are negative, respectively.
 15 
                                                 
15 We also used Jensen’s alpha as a performance measure. Tables are available upon request. The results are 
similar to the ones reported in Table 4.  
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The reason why we include an indicator variable D(Negative Return) in Equation (2) is to 
allow for different flow-return sensitivities subsequent to positive or negative returns. The 
coefficients in Equation (2) can now be interpreted as follows: β1 captures the sensitivity of flows to 
positive average returns in the previous year, (β1+β2) expresses the sensitivity of flows to negative 
average returns in the previous year. Likewise, β3 stands for the sensitivity of flows to positive 
average returns in year –2, while (β3+β4) captures the sensitivity of flows to negative average returns 
in year –2. The t-statistics are calculated using White standard errors to account for heterogeneity.16  
The vector of control variables in Equation (2), denoted as Control Variablesi,t-1, captures the 
impact of seven groups of variables: Fund Characteristics, Past Flows, Fund Family, International 
Diversification, Screening Activity, Geographical Location and Time Effect. The Fund 
Characteristics consist of: (i) Sizei,t-1, the size of the fund (the natural logarithm of AUM in ) at 
month t-1, (ii) Riski,[t-1,t-12], the total risk of the fund measured as the standard deviation of monthly 
fund returns from months t-1 to t-12, (iii) Agei,t-1, (the number of years since its inception), (iv) Agei,t-
1* D(Youngi,t-1), a term interacting the age with an indicator variable equalling one if the funds’ age is 
below the median of all SRI funds (or conventional ones – depending on the regression) in its 
domicile for month t-1, (v) Total Feesi, defined as the sum of the annual management fee and one 
seventh of the sum of the front- and the back-end load fees, (vi) Total Feesi *D(High Feesi), a term 
interacting the total fees with an indicator variable equalling one if the funds’ total fees are above the 
median total fees of all SRI funds (or conventional ones) in its domicile. Moreover, we include the 
past flows, Flowi,t-1  (the money-flows of the fund in month t-1), as a control variable.  
Subsequently, we use three variables to proxy for the reputation of fund families in the SRI 
or conventional fund industries: (i) D(Top Performer Familyi,t-1), an indicator variable equalling one 
if the raw return of at least one SRI (or conventional) fund in the funds’ family belongs to the top 
20% of all SRI or conventional funds in its domicile at month t-1, (ii) Number of Funds in Familyi, t-1 
,  the number of SRI (or conventional) funds managed by the funds’ family at month t-1, (iii) D 
(Market Leader Familyi,t-1), an indicator variable equalling one if the funds’ family has the highest 
market share of SRI (or conventional) assets among all fund families in its domicile at t-1.  
Furthermore, the International Diversification variables include two mutually exclusive 
indicators, denoted as D(European Diversificationi) and D(Global Diversificationi), which equal one 
                                                 
16 When estimating an equation similar to Equation (2) for mutual funds, Sirri and Tufano (1998) recommend 
the use of the Fama and MacBeth (FM) procedure, which estimates a cross-sectional regression for each month 
and allows for potential cross-sectional dependence between fund observations. However, in our case the FM 
procedure would produce inaccurate estimates, because our sample of SRI funds is an unbalanced panel and 
there are few funds in the early months of our sample period. Our approach of using OLS estimates and White 
standard errors is consistent with that of Del Guercio and Tkac (2002). When we apply the FM procedure on a 
subsample including only the monthly data of the last 5 years of our sample, we obtain similar results.    
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if the fund invests across Europe or Globally, respectively. The reference group is the funds 
investing in their domestic countries. 
For the SRI funds, the Screening Activity comprises the following variables: (i) Number of 
Screensi is the number of SRI screens (listed in Table 1) used by a fund, (ii) D(Sin Screensi), 
D(Ethical Screensi), D(Social Screensi) and D(Environmental Screensi) are four indicator variables 
which equal one if the fund uses at least one of the SRI screens from a broad screening area, i.e. sin, 
ethical, social or environmental screens, respectively17, (iii) D(Islamic Fundi) is an indicator variable 
capturing whether the fund is designed for Islamic investors, (iv) D(Activism Policyi) is an indicator 
variable which equals one if the fund intends to influence corporate behaviour through direct 
engagement or proxy voting, (v) D(In-House SRI Researchi) is an indicator variable which equals 
one if the screening activities of the fund are based on in-house SRI research.  
In order to capture differences in the money-flows across geographical locations, we include 
mutually exclusive indicator variables based on the domicile of the fund, denoted as D(Europei ex. 
UK), D(USi) and D(Rest of Worldi). The SRI funds in the UK are the reference group. Finally, we 
also include fixed time effects to control for the bubble and recession periods, i.e. nine year dummies 
and eleven month dummies, denoted as D(Yeari,t) and D(Monthi,t).
18  
In Panel A of Table 4 we present the estimation results of Equation (2) for the SRI funds, 
while we show the results for the benchmark mutual funds in Panel B. We find that the money-flows 
of SRI funds are more sensitive to past returns when these returns are positive than when they are 
negative. In particular, the money-flows of SRI funds increase 0.95% per month for a 1% increase in 
the previous year’s average monthly returns, provided that the return is positive. In case of negative 
average returns, the corresponding money-flows decrease by a modest 0.20% for a 1% decrease in 
return. This result corresponds to the one by Bollen and Cohen (2005) who also document that the 
flow-return sensitivity for US SRI funds is stronger for positive past returns than for negative ones. 
Moreover, we also report that the money-flows are sensitive to the returns of both the previous two 
years. For instance, when the first and second return lags are positive, a 1% difference in average 
monthly returns in both these years is associated with a 1.55% difference per month in money-flows. 
Thus, it appears that ethical money chases past returns, moving disproportionately more to SRI funds 
that performed very well in the past. The flow-performance relationship is weaker when past 
performance is poor.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
                                                 
17 These four indicator variables are not mutually exclusive. All of them may equal one in case that a fund 
employs screens from the four main screening categories. 




The convex relation between flow and past performance, in combination with the 
compensation structure in the mutual fund industry where management fees depend on fund size, 
gives fund companies a payout that resembles a call option (Sirri and Tufano, 1998). Fund managers 
have incentives to increase the volatility of fund returns in order to maximize the value of this call 
option (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997). In the conventional mutual fund industry, the risk of the fund 
generally has a negative impact on money-flows (see, e.g., Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Barber, Odean 
and Zheng, 2005). Surprisingly, ethical money is not sensitive to the past risk of investments, i.e. 
higher fund return volatility does not reduce the money-flows into SRI funds. This fact may 
influence the risk-taking incentives of SRI fund managers.  
The money-flows of SRI funds are also influenced by the other fund characteristics. As new 
SRI funds may be more innovative and exert more marketing efforts than existing funds, younger 
SRI funds may attract more flows than older funds. In addition, smaller funds may attract a larger 
percentage of inflows. Consistent with studies on money-flows of conventional mutual funds (see, 
Sirri and Tufano, 1998, and Barber, Odean and Zheng, 2005), we find that smaller and younger SRI 
funds attract more inflows than bigger and older funds. Using a subsample of US SRI funds as these 
funds report data on marketing expenses (the ‘12B1 fees’), we find that funds with higher marketing 
expenses attract more flows. The impact of marketing expenses on money-inflows is indeed stronger 
for younger SRI funds.19 Our results are consistent with those of Barber, Odean and Zheng (2005) 
for conventional US funds and may also explain why older funds (which spend less on marketing) 
attract fewer flows.  
 A striking finding is that increases in the total fees to SRI investors do not reduce the 
money-flows. When the total fees are above the country median in its domicile country, the flows are 
0.1% lower (though not statistically significant based on a Wald test) for a 1% increase in fees. This 
is in contrast to the findings for conventional mutual funds where high fees significantly reduce 
flows (see, Sirri and Tufano, 1998, and Barber, Odean and Zheng, 2005). Our results indicate that 
SRI investors pay less attention to fund fees than conventional investors, which implies that SRI 
investors are willing to pay for holding assets consistent with their social objectives. The 
insignificant impact of costs on flows may incentivize fund families to enter into the SRI niche 
market. As argued by Massa (2003) and Khorana and Servaes (2004), price competition is lower for 
more differentiated funds. Thus, given that SRI investors care less about fees, fund managers have 
                                                 
19 Tables are available upon request.  
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incentives to follow costly marketing strategies in order to attract investors and hence enhance 
management fees.  
Panel A of Table 4 also documents that SRI investors do not chase past flows. This does not 
come as a surprise as information on past money-flows (in contrast to information on past 
performance) is not readily available to most retail investors.  
Most SRI funds are members of fund families. For example, ‘Calvert’ is the largest SRI fund 
family in the US, which manages more than 10 SRI funds. As suggested by Sirri and Tufano (1998) 
and Nanda, Wang and Zheng (2004), stellar performance of a mutual fund may generate money-
flows for other funds in its family. However, we do not find such a spillover effect in the SRI fund 
industry. It is common that fund families offer investors the option of switching to other funds 
belonging to the same family at low cost. Thus, the higher the number of funds in the family, the 
greater the value of this option (Massa, 2003). We find that the total number of SRI funds in the 
family has a significant positive impact on the money-flows: a one-standard deviation increase in the 
number of funds (i.e. 4.2 funds) is associated with 0.3% higher money-flows per month. We also 
find that market leadership in the SRI industry (as a proxy for family reputation) has no impact on 
the money-flows. Table 4 (Panel A) also shows that money-flows of SRI funds are not significantly 
affected by whether or not the funds invest abroad.  
Interestingly, we find that the number of SRI screens used affects the money-flows in a 
significantly positive way, even after controlling for the type of screens. Suppose that a fund 
employs 10 SRI screens based on social and environmental criteria, whereas a second fund uses only 
one social screen and one environmental screen (i.e. the difference in the number of screens between 
the funds is about two-standard deviations). The fund with more screens attracts about 1% higher 
money-flows per month. However, some screens, namely ethical and environmental screens, seem 
less attractive relative to other SRI screens. For instance, a fund that uses ethical criteria, such as 
animal testing, anti-abortion, or Islamic screens, receives 1% less money per month compared to 
funds not using such screens, and a fund using environmental screens attract 0.9% less money per 
month.20 Funds engaging in shareholder activism receive 0.5% less flows per month (significant at 
the 6% level). Moreover, stock picking based on in-house SRI research has little impact on the 
money-flows. This implies that SRI funds have few incentives to influence company behavior via 
activism or to conduct SRI research themselves.  
                                                 
20 We also investigate whether employing more SRI screens is associated with higher fees. We find that larger 
funds and funds with more screens charge lower total fees to investors, whereas funds employing sin screens, 
environmental screens, or Islamic screens charge higher fees than funds without these screens. Contrary to our 
expectations, funds engaging in shareholder activism or conducting SRI research in-house do not charge higher 
fees. The tables are available upon request. 
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Finally, the negative coefficients for the regional dummies indicate that, after controlling for 
performance and non-financial attributes, SRI funds in the UK attract significantly more money than 
their counterparts in the other European countries, the US and the Rest of the World. The strong 
growth of SRI industry in the UK may be partially attributed to the regulation regarding SRI, as 
discussed above.  
When we compare the results of Panel A of Table 4 with the determinants of money-flows 
of conventional UK mutual funds (reported in Panel B), some striking differences emerge. First, past 
average returns matter for conventional funds, but their impact on money-flows is smaller in 
magnitude. Specifically, the money-flows of conventional funds increase 0.78% per month for a 1% 
increase in the average monthly return over the prior year when this return is positive. In case of a 
negative return over the previous year, the money-flows increase by only 0.31%. Consistent with 
Bollen and Cohen (2005), we find that money-flows of SRI funds are more sensitive to lagged 
positive returns than flows in conventional funds, but less sensitive to lagged negative returns. 
Second, in contrast to SRI funds, the total fees of conventional funds have a negative affect on the 
money-flows. The annual money-flows of conventional funds are 10.8% lower for a 1% increase in 
total fees when the fees are above the country median in its domicile country, while they are 6.8% 
lower in case the fees are above the country median (see Panel A of the Appendix for a summary of 
the economic effects in Tables 4-6). Our results suggest that ethical money is less sensitive to the 
fund fees than money invested in conventional mutual equity funds. Furthermore, while past flows 
do not significantly affect ethical money-flows, conventional funds’ investors invest significantly 
less in funds with high inflows over the previous year. Third, we find a ‘spillover’ effect for 
conventional UK funds: having a star performer in the fund family increase flows by 0.3% per 
month. Furthermore, family reputation matters. The conventional funds of whom the fund family is a 
market leader attract 0.6% more money-flows per month (marginally significant at the 10% level). 
Finally, while international diversification does not influence the money-flows of SRI funds, it has a 
significant negative impact on the money-flows of conventional UK funds. 
 
B. Flows and Past Relative Performance 
 
Barberis and Shleifer (2003) argue that investors categorize risky assets into different broad 
classes such as value stocks and growth stocks, and allocate money to these asset classes rather than 
to individual securities. Hence, investors may regard SRI funds as a separate category of mutual 
funds and evaluate the performance of an SRI fund relative to that of other SRI funds in their 
country. In addition, investors often use return rankings published in newspapers and financial 
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magazines to select mutual funds (Sirri and Tufano, 1998). Therefore, we repeat the analysis in 
Section A with alternative performance measures: we classify a fund’s monthly returns into five 
performance quintiles relative to the returns of all other SRI funds in the fund’s domicile.  
 In order to examine whether relative performance affects the money-flows for SRI mutual 
funds around the world as well as of conventional (non-SRI) UK mutual funds, we estimate the 
following regression:   
 
Flowi,t = β0 + β1 Rank Bottom Quintilei,[t-1,t-12] + β2 Rank Middle Quintilei,[t-1,t-12] + β3 Rank 
Top Quintilei,[t-1,t-12]+β4Rank Bottom Quintilei,[t-13,t-24] + β5 Rank Middle Quintilei,[t-13,t-24] + β6 Rank 
Top Quintilei,[t-13,t-24] +  Control Variablesi,t-1 + ui,t            (3) 
 
where Rank Bottom Quintile, Rank Middle Quintile and Rank Top Quintile are the fractional rank 
quintiles, constructed as follows. First, for each month t, the average returns over month t-1 to month 
t-12 (Average Returni,[t-1,t-12]) are ranked relative to all funds in the domicile, and each fund is 
assigned a fractional rank (Ranki,[t-1,t-12]) ranging from 0 (the poorest performance in the domicile) 
through 1 (the best performance in the domicile). For instance, a Rank of 0.7 implies that the fund is 
better than 70% of all SRI funds in the domicile based on the previous year’s return. Subsequently, 
the bottom quintile of fractional rank (Rank Bottom Quintilei, [t-1,t-12]) is defined as Min (0.2, Ranki,t-1), 
the middle three fractional rank quintiles are combined into one (Rank Middle Quintilei,[t-1,t-12]) 
defined as Min (0.6, Ranki,[t-1,t-12] - Rank Bottom Quintilei,[t-1,t-12]), and the top quintile of fractional 
rank (Rank Top Quintilei,[t-1,t-12]) is defined as Min (0.2, Ranki,[t-1,t-12] - Rank Bottom Quintile i,[t-1,t-12] - 
Rank Middle Quintilei,[t-1,t-12]). Similarly, Rank Bottom Quintilei,[t-13,t-24], Rank Middle Quintilei,[t-13,t-
24], and Rank Top Quintilei,[t-13,t-24] are defined on the basis of the ranking of average returns over 
month t-13 to month t-24 (Average Returni,[t-13,t-24]). As in Equation (2), the vector Control 
Variablesi,t-1 is included in order to examine whether other factors in addition to past relative 
performance affect the decision to invest in an SRI fund or a conventional one. In Panel A of Table 5 
we present the estimation results of Equation (3) for the SRI funds, while in Panel B we present the 
results for the conventional UK mutual funds.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
Panel A of Table 5 shows that relative past performance matters and that outstanding relative 
performance matters proportionally more. If an SRI fund is ranked in the top-quintile among the SRI 
funds in its country, the fund can expect about 1.1% more flows per month for every 10-percentile 
improvement in performance ranking (say from the 85th to the 95th percentile). Only 0.2% extra 
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money per month can be expected if the fund is ranked in the middle quintiles in the previous year 
(i.e. for an improvement in performance ranking from the 45th to the 55th percentile). An overview of 
the economic significance is given in Panel A of the Appendix. The insignificant coefficient on the 
bottom quintile indicates that money-flows into or out of the bottom 20% of SRI funds are not 
sensitive to poor past performance. Furthermore, if an SRI fund was consistently in the top-quintile 
during the previous two years, the fund can expect about 1.7% more inflows per month. Our results 
are of similar economic magnitude as those reported by Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Agarwal, Daniel 
and Naik (2004) for conventional mutual funds and hedge funds, respectively. Moreover, the 
relations between fund characteristics and the money-flows into and out of SRI mutual funds are in 
line with those presented in Panel A of Table 4.  
For non-SRI UK funds, we find that strong relative performance significantly affects the 
money-flows to the funds. A consistent top performer during the previous two years can expect 
about 1.3% more flows per month for every 10-percentile improvement in performance ranking.  
 
C. Flows and Persistence in Past Performance 
 
In addition to past returns and rankings, trends in past performance may also influence 
investor behavior. Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) develop a model of investor sentiment where 
investors hold the belief that the return process switches between a ‘continuation’ regime (in which 
asset returns are persistent) and a ‘reversal’ regime (in which asset returns tend to reverse in sign). 
Investors observe the trends and patterns in past performance to determine which regime currently 
regulates performance, and make their investment decisions accordingly. Therefore, we examine 
whether investors pay attention to persistence in past performance of SRI funds and direct more 
money to the funds of a persistently winning regime.  
An SRI fund is considered as a persistent winner (loser) if its return is higher (lower) than 
the return of the median fund in the domicile over the previous two years (see e.g. Brown, 
Goetzmann and Ibbotson, 1999 and Agarwal, Daniel and Naik, 2004). To investigate how investors 
react to information on winners and losers, we estimate the following regression: 
 
Flowi,t = β0 + β1 D(Persistent Winneri, [t-1,t-24]) +β2 D(Persistent Loseri, [t-1,t-24]) +β3 D(Loser 
to Winneri, [t-1,t-24]) +  Control Variablesi,t-1 + ui,t      (4) 
 
We label a fund as a winner when the indicator variable D(Winneri,[t-1,t-12]) equals one; this is 
the case when the average return for fund i over month t-1 to month t-12 (Average Return i,[t-1,t-12]) is 
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higher than the average return over the same period of the median fund in its domicile (see Section II 
for our definition of funds’ nationality)21. Likewise, D(Persistent Winneri, [t-1,t-24]) is an indicator 
variable capturing that a fund is a persistent winner. This dummy equals one if fund i is a winner 
over both the periods t-1 to t-12 and t-13 to t-24 (i.e. D(Winneri,[t-1,t-12]) =1 and D(Winneri,[t-13,t-24]) =1) 
and is zero otherwise. D(Persistent Loseri, [t-1,t-24]) is an indicator variable that reflects that a fund is a 
persistent loser: it equals one if fund i is not a winner for both the above periods (i.e. D(Winneri,[t-1,t-
12]) =0 and D(Winneri,[t-13,t-24]) =0) and is zero otherwise. Finally, D(Loser to Winneri, [t-1,t-24]) is an 
indicator variable that equals one if fund i is a winner over the same periods (i.e. D(Winneri,[t-1,t-12]) 
=1 and D(Winneri,[t-13,t-24]) =0) and is zero otherwise. The vector of Control Variablesi,t-1 is defined as 
in Equations (2) and (3). The specification of Equation (4) allows us to estimate the difference in 
money-flows between the following four categories of SRI funds: (i) persistent winners; (ii) 
persistent losers; (iii) losers in year Y–2 turning into winners in year Y–1; and (iv) winners in year 
Y–2 turning to losers in year Y–1. The coefficients in Equation (4) can be interpreted as follows: β1 
is the difference in money-flows between persistent winners and funds reversing from winner to 
loser, β2 captures the difference between persistent losers and funds reversing from winner to loser, 
and β3 measures the difference in flows between funds reversing from loser to winner and those 
reversing from winner to loser. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
Panel A of Table 6 presents the estimation results of Equation (4) for the SRI funds, while 
Panel B shows those for our benchmark of conventional UK mutual funds. We find that persistence 
in fund returns has a significant impact on money-flows. SRI funds that are persistent winners can 
expect money-flows that are about 0.8% higher on a monthly basis (or about 10% annually) than 
funds reversing from winner to loser. More importantly, persistent losers experience significantly 
more outflows of money, i.e. about 1.6% on a monthly basis (19.2% annually) than funds reversing 
from winner to loser. Thus, funds that are persistent winners receive about 30% more money-flows 
than persistent losers. Consistent with Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), our results suggest that 
investors direct more flows to funds that are believed to be in a positive ‘continuation’ regime than 
‘reversal’ funds. Interestingly, the coefficient for the ‘in house’ dummy indicates that SRI funds 
which rely on SRI research performed by an ‘in house’ team can expect about 0.43% higher monthly 
                                                 
21 Note that Loser to Winner has correlation coefficients of 0.59 and –0.56 with Persistent Winner and 
Persistent Loser, respectively. To avoid the problem of multicollinearity, we also exclude Loser to Winner 
from Equation (4) and find that the coefficients on Persistent Winner and Persistent Loser remain statistically 
significant. 
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inflows (significant at the 6% level), ceteris paribus. All other estimates of the coefficients for the 
control variables are in line with the specifications of above subsections.  
For conventional funds, we find similar results (see Panel B), although persistent 
conventional losers are less affected than persistent SRI losers. For persistent winners the effect is 
stronger than in case of SRI funds. Persistent winners can expect about 1.1% higher monthly inflows 
than the reversal conventional funds.  
The results from Table 4, 5 and 6 show that, similar to conventional investors, SRI investors 
chase past returns, return rankings and persistence in performance. SRI investors are less sensitive to 
negative returns than positive returns unless poor performance persists. One of the most important 
differences between SRI funds and conventional funds is the impact of fund fees on the money-
flows. In contrast to conventional funds’ investors, ethical investors are not so sensitive to magnitude 
of the fees (management fees and load fees). This fact may incentivize fund families to enter into the 
SRI niche market. In addition, the fact that ethical money is not sensitive to risk may influence the 
risk-taking incentives of SRI fund managers.  
 
IV. Money-Flow Volatility 
 
High volatility of money-flows is a burden for fund managers, because they have to buy or 
sell the shares of their portfolios following the net purchases or sales of shares in the funds. Such 
liquidity-motivated trading increases the trading costs and may thus depress fund performance 
(Edelen, 1999). High volatility of money-flows may also be a burden for long-term investors. 
Goetzmann, Ivkovich and Rouwenhorst (2001) show that speculators adopt market-timing strategies 
by trading mutual funds at high frequency (e.g. on a daily basis) in order to exploit the valuation 
errors of funds’ daily share prices related to underlying security prices. They show that such trades 
may be at the expense of long-term investors. Furthermore, to the extent that high volatility of 
money-flows results from the presence of myopic investors who reallocate their assets frequently, 
flow volatility is a proxy for the investment horizons of investors whereby high volatility proxies for 
shorter time horizons (Massa, 2003). Therefore, both fund managers and investors prefer less volatile 
flows.  
Bollen and Cohen (2005) document that US SRI fund flows are less volatile than 
conventional fund flows. We extend this line of research by relating flow volatility to past 
performance and various fund characteristics and estimate the following equation: 
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Flow Volatilityi,[t,t-11] = β0 + β1 Average Returni,[t-12,t-23] + β2 Average Returni,[t-12,t-23] 
*D(Negative Returni,[t-12,t-23]) +  Control Variablesi,t-12 + ui,t      (5) 
 
where Flow Volatilityi,[t,t-11] is the standard deviation of monthly money-flows of fund i over months t 
to t-11. The returns and the control variables are defined in Equation (2), with Flowi,t-12 replaced by 
Average Flowi,[t-12,t-23]. The coefficients in Equation (5) can be interpreted as follows: β1 measures the 
sensitivity of flow volatilities to positive average returns of the previous year, and β1+β2 measures 
the sensitivity of flow volatilities to negative average returns of the previous year. Panel A of Table 7 
presents the estimation results of Equation (5) for the SRI funds, while Panel B reports the ones for 
our benchmark of conventional UK funds.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
From Panel A, we learn that positive returns over the previous year lead to higher flows 
volatility: monthly flow volatility is 0.8% higher for a 1% increase in returns. This is in line with the 
fact that investors flock to SRI funds when returns are high but attach less importance to negative 
returns unless poor performance persists. However, we find that this is not entirely true for the 
conventional funds in Panel B: monthly flow volatility is 0.4% higher for a 1% increase in returns 
when past returns are positive; but flow volatility goes up 0.4% for a 1% decrease in returns when 
past returns are negative (see Panel B of the Appendix for a summary of the economic effects of 
Table 7). 
Chevalier and Ellison (1997) show that money-flows of young funds are more sensitive to 
past returns than those of old funds. We expect therefore that younger funds have a higher flow 
volatility. Likewise, smaller funds may have a higher standard deviation of flows. Furthermore, the 
volatility of fund returns may attract myopic investors and increase flow volatility. In line with our 
expectations, we find that smaller, younger or riskier SRI funds are associated with higher flow 
volatility. Fund fees, especially load fees, increase the transaction costs for SRI investors who want 
to invest or transfer money across funds frequently, such that the money-flow volatility is expected 
to be lower for the more expensive funds (Massa, 2003). We find that this is indeed the case for the 
SRI funds: an increase of 1% in total fees moves down the flow volatility by 0.3%. In contrast, the 
volatility of the most expensive conventional funds is higher (Panel B of Table 7). We also find that 
SRI funds with higher past flows have more volatile flows. 
As discussed above, fund families usually offer investors the option to switch to funds 
belonging to the same family at low cost. Due to the reduced transaction fees of reallocating assets 
across funds, myopic investors may prefer mutual funds belonging to a big family. Indeed, we find 
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that the total number of SRI funds in the family has a significant positive impact on flow volatilities, 
implying that larger families attract less stable flows. Furthermore, monthly flow volatility is 0.4% 
higher for SRI funds belonging families with top performers, and 0.9% higher for families occupying 
a leading position in the domestic SRI market. Global diversification strategies by SRI funds attract 
investors with a longer investment horizon. Panel B shows that the impact of fund family 
characteristics on flow volatilities is twice as high for conventional funds. This shows that 
conventional fund investors attach more importance to fund family characteristics, such as whether 
or not having a top performer, number of funds and market leaderships, than SRI investors.  
It appears that SRI screens have a strong impact on the flow volatility of the SRI funds. A 
one standard deviation increase in the number of screens (i.e. 4 screens) moves up flow volatility by 
0.7% per month. The monthly flow volatility of funds applying ethical or environmental screens is 
lower by 1.4% and 0.8%, respectively, compared to other types of SRI funds. Most interestingly, 
shareholder activism and in-house SRI research attract more stable investors to the fund: the monthly 
flow volatility is significantly reduced by 1.4% and 0.6%, respectively. These effects are also 
economically significant given the average flow volatility of 7.9% in our sample. Finally, ethical 
money in the UK is more volatile that in the rest of Europe and much more volatile than in the US 
and the Rest of the World. 
 
V. Money-Flows and Future Performance 
 
We have shown in Section III that the money-flows of SRI funds are affected by many factors 
including past performance and the use of SRI screens. While SRI investors chase past returns, a 
question of considerable importance is whether SRI funds receiving most of the cash flows perform 
well in the future. Or put differently, is ethical money financially smart? A number of studies on 
conventional mutual funds document a ‘smart money’ effect where money-flows can predict short-
term fund performance (Gruber, 1996; Zheng, 1999), while Sapp and Tiwari (2004) show that this 
effect can be explained by the momentum effect of stock returns. In contrast to the smart money 
effect, Frazzini and Lamont (2005) document a ‘dumb money’ effect where individual investors 
invest their money in mutual funds which own stocks that perform poorly over subsequent years. In 
their model with rational investors and competitive capital markets, Berk and Green (2004) assume 
that the mutual fund industry has decreasing returns to scale, i.e. fund returns decrease with fund size 
and new money-inflows chasing past performance may have a negative impact on future 
performance. Furthermore, Chen, Hong, Huang and Kubik (2004) confirm that fund size erodes 
performance due to liquidity and organizational diseconomies, and the relation is more pronounced 
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for funds investing in small and illiquid stocks. We expect that this effect is even stronger for SRI 
mutual funds, since SRI screens constrain the investment universe. This limitation may force large 
funds or funds receiving substantial money-flows to invest part of their money in firms with low 
risk-adjusted returns. Consequently, large SRI funds may perform worse in the future.  
 
A. Money-flows and Future Returns 
 
We investigate the impact of flows and fund characteristics on future fund returns by 
estimating the following equation: 
 
Returni,t = β0 + β1 Average Flowi,[t-1,t-12] +β2 Sizei,t-1 +β3 Sizei,t-1 * Average Flowi,[t-1,t-12] + 
Control Variablesi,t-1 + u i,t          (6) 
 
where, Returni,t is the raw return of fund i in month t, Average Flowi,[t-1,t-12] is the average money-
flow of fund i from months t-1 to t-12, and Control Variablesi,t-1 is a vector of lagged variables of 
fund characteristics defined similarly as before in Equation (2), but in which we have replaced 
Flowi,t-1 by Average Returni,[t-1,t-12]. In addition to raw returns, we also use the abnormal returns as a 
dependent variable.22  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
We report the estimation results of Equations (6) and (7) for SRI funds in Panel A of Table 
8, while Panel B shows those for the conventional UK funds. We find some interesting differences 
between SRI funds and conventional funds. It appears that past average money-flows have a 
significant negative impact on future returns of SRI funds. An increase by one standard deviation in 
past average flows (i.e. 16% per month) to an SRI fund predicts a reduction of the raw returns and 
abnormal returns by about 20 basis points per month (2.3% annually). For conventional UK funds 
we find no relation between past average flows and next month’s return (see Panel C of the 
Appendix for a summary of the economic effects of Tables 8-9).  
Furthermore, in line with Berk and Green (2004) and Chen, Hong, Huang and Kubik (2004), 
we find that fund size has a negative impact on future returns of both SRI and conventional funds: all 
                                                 
22 Abnormal Returni,t = Returni,t - Rf,t - βi (Rm,t - Rf,t) (7), where Rf,t is the one-month inter-bank interest rate 
(offering rate or middle rate) in month t in the country where fund i domiciles,  Rm,t is the return for MSCI 
indices (dividend reinvested) in month t in the country where fund i domiciles, and βi is estimated via the OLS 
regression, Returni,t - Rf,t =  i + βi (Rm,t - Rf,t) + ui,t , for fund i with at least 12 months history. 
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else equal, a one standard deviation increase in size (i.e. 2.21) erodes future raw returns as well as 
abnormal returns by 22 basis points per month (2.6% annually). Both SRI funds and conventional 
ones are confronted with decreasing returns to scale.  
Moreover, risk has a negative impact on SRI fund returns. Adopting an increase in total risk 
by 2% (equivalent to an increase by one standard deviation) reduces next month’s raw return and 
abnormal return of SRI funds by 16 basis points (1.9% annually) and 22 basis points (2.6% 
annually), respectively. In contrast, the impact for conventional funds is insignificant. Total fund fees 
do not significantly affect the returns of SRI funds.  
An interesting result is that SRI fund returns (in contrast to those of conventional funds) are 
to some extent predictable. It appears that average past SRI returns have a significant positive impact 
on future returns: a 1% higher average past return gives about 7 basis points extra expected return in 
the next month (0.8% annually), but the momentum is economically small. Furthermore, SRI funds 
benefiting from the membership of an SRI family that includes top performers can expect an 
additional return of about 19 basis points per month (2.3% annually) or an additional abnormal 
return of 28 basis points per month (3.4% annually). Despite the fact that SRI investors allocate more 
flows to larger families, a standard deviation increase in the number of funds in a family reduces 
next month’s abnormal return by 8 basis points (significant within the 10% level).  
Finally, fund returns increase with screening intensity (proxied by the number of SRI screens 
applied). This supports the hypothesis that SRI criteria help fund managers picking stocks. All else 
equal, funds with 8 more SRI screens (i.e. a two standard deviation difference) are associated with 38 
basis points higher abnormal return per month (4.6% annually). However, funds employing an 
environmental screen can expect 27 basis points (3.2% annually) lower returns than funds without 
such a screen. It seems that environmental screens have a large negative impact on performance due 
to the fact that it seriously limits diversification possibilities.  
 
B. Money-Flows and Persistence in Future Performance 
 
In the previous subsection, we concluded that bigger funds with higher inflows generate 
lower returns in the near future. In order to examine whether such funds have also a lower 
probability of persistence in future performance, we estimate the following equations using a probit 
model: 
 
      Persistent Winneri,[t,t-23]=β0 +β1 Average Flowi,[t-24,t-35] +Control Variablesi,t-24+ ui,t       (8) 
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      Persistent Loseri,[t,t-23]=β0 +β1 Average Flowi,[t-24,t-35] +Control Variablesi,t-24 + ui,t              (9)       
         
where, Persistent Winner and Persistent Loser are defined as in Equation (4), Average Flowi,[t-24,t-35] 
is defined in Equation (6), and Control Variablesi,t-24 are  defined as in Equation (2) however with  
Flowi,t-1 replaced by Average Returni,[t-24,t-35] . 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
The estimation results of the probit specification of persistent winners (Equation 8) are 
shown in Panels A (SRI funds) and C (conventional funds) of Table 9, while Panel B (SRI funds) 
and D (conventional funds) report the estimation results for persistent losers (Equation (9)). Our 
results show that larger funds with high inflows are less likely to be persistent winners: a one 
standard deviation increase in fund size or in money-flows is associated with a decrease in the 
probability of being a persistent winner by about 7% and 3%, respectively. The result is also 
economically significant, given that the unconditional probability of being a persistent winner is 
25%.23 Our findings are in line with Berk and Green (2004) who argue that the absence of 
persistence in performance in the mutual fund industry is due to decreasing returns to scale caused 
by investors chasing past performance. 
While risk has an insignificant impact on being a persistent winner in the case of SRI funds, 
we find that high risk decreases the probability of being a persistent winner for conventional funds. 
Being a persistent winner is also less likely for older funds, funds with higher fees and funds with 
low past returns, whereas the probability augments when the number of funds belonging to the same 
fund family is large and when the fund family of the SRI fund is the market leader. In terms of 
economic significance, an increase by one standard deviation in the number of funds in the family 
(i.e. 4 funds) is associated with an increase in the probability of being a persistent winner by 7%. 
This result can by explained by the fact fund families may subsidize the performance of the 
‘favourite’ funds, i.e. who performed well in the past or have high fees, in order to attract money-
inflows to those funds (Gaspar, Massa and Matos, 2004). The cross-fund subsidization, such as 
allocation of underpriced IPO deals and opposite trades across member funds, may generate 
persistence in performance of funds in bigger or market-leading families. Investing globally has a 
negative affect on return persistence for both SRI funds and conventional ones. Moreover, the 
probability of being a persistent winner goes down by 2% when 1 additional SRI screen is employed. 
                                                 
23 As discussed in Section III.C, we classify funds into four categories depending on the persistence in 
performance: persistent winners, persistent losers, winners turning into losers, or losers turning into winners. 
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This is congruent with the hypothesis that SRI screens limit the diversification possibilities and thus 




This paper contributes to the growing literature on the behavior of investors in mutual funds. 
First, we study the behavior of ‘ethical’ investors, namely of those investing in Socially Responsible 
Investment funds. This group of investors explicitly cares about non-financial investment screens 
used in the portfolio selection. Second, we analyze whether SRI screens affect the money-flows in 
SRI funds in a multivariate framework which also includes the size, age, risk, past returns, degree of 
diversification, geographical location and the fee structure of these funds as well as the role of the 
fund family they belong to. Finally, we study the volatility of the money-flows and examine whether 
money-flows are able to predict future fund performance. We use a comprehensive dataset consisting 
of nearly all SRI equity funds around the world, as well as of conventional mutual funds from the 
UK (as a benchmark) over the sample period 1992–2003.  
The results suggest that SRI (or ‘ethical’) investors chase past returns, past return rankings, 
and persistence in past performance, as do investors in conventional mutual funds. In particular, SRI 
funds that can be denoted as persistent winners receive about 30% more money inflows than 
persistent losers. Unless a fund persistently underperforms, SRI investors care more about past 
positive returns than about past negative returns. We also show that a higher screening intensity 
attracts more money-inflows than funds employing few screens. The funds that use environmental 
screens (e.g. restricting investments in firms producing or using non-renewable energy) or ethical 
screens (e.g. limiting investments in firms using animal testing or producing abortion drugs) attract 
fewer money-flows. An interesting difference between SRI funds and conventional funds is the 
effect of fund fees on the money-flows. The results show that the decision to invest in an SRI fund is 
less affected by management fees and load fees than the decision to invest in conventional funds. 
This may incentivize fund management companies to enter the SRI market as ethical investors seem 
to be willing to pay for the management of portfolios consistent with their social objectives.    
The variability in the money-flows is a serious concern of mutual fund managers because it 
can depress fund performance due to the costs of trading the shares of the funds’ portfolios which are 
triggered by the net purchases or sales of shares in the funds. In line with our expectations, we find 
that smaller, younger or riskier SRI funds have higher money-flow volatility, partly resulting from 
the higher marketing efforts of these funds. Furthermore, our results indicate that the money-flow 
volatility is higher for SRI funds that experienced good recent performance, or belong to a larger 
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fund family or to a family with top performing funds. More specifically, monthly flow volatility is 
about 0.9% higher for families with a leading position in the domestic market and an additional 0.4% 
per month higher when the fund family includes a star fund. This may be due to the fact that myopic 
investors prefer funds belonging to a large family because switching between funds within the family 
can usually be done at low cost. An interesting result is that shareholder activism and in-house 
research of an SRI fund significantly lowers the monthly flow volatility by 1.4% and 0.6%, 
respectively. Apparently, these two attributes attract more stable investors to the fund.   
While we show that SRI investors chase past returns, we also examine whether or not SRI 
investors are able to select (invest their money in) funds that will generate high future performance. 
One the one hand, the use of SRI screens constrains the investment universe of mutual funds and 
there is evidence that conventional funds are confronted with decreasing returns to scale (Berk and 
Green, 2004; Chen, Hong, Huang and Kubik, 2004). On the other hand, active fund management by 
using (positive) screens may generate superior returns. Our results show that the SRI funds attracting 
most flows are not generating higher returns: the future abnormal return is 2.3% (annually) lower for 
SRI funds attracting money-flows exceeding the average flow by one standard deviation. This 
finding is reinforced by our analysis of the impact of past flows on persistence in (future) returns: we 
demonstrate that the probability that funds arise as persistent winners is reduced when these funds 
attract large past money inflows and that the probability of being persistent losers augments for 
popular SRI funds. We interpret this evidence by the emergence of decreasing returns of scale in 
fund investments. Thus, it seems that ethical money is not financially smart in the sense that the 
mutual fund reallocation decisions of SRI investors reduce their wealth. But there is one caveat to 
this conclusion: we find a positive relation between the use of SRI screens and future performance: 
the screening intensity of SRI funds improves returns. In particular, an SRI fund with 8 more screens 
is expected (all else equal) to have a higher abnormal return of 38 basis points per month (i.e. 4.6% 
annually) than focused SRI funds. Apparently, funds with more SRI screens attracting higher money-
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Table 1:  Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) Screens 
 
This table reports the 21 investment screens used by SRI funds around the world which are classified into 4 broad 
categories. SRI funds often use a combination of the screens. ’N’ represents a negative screen (funds avoid specific 
industries or firms); ’P’ denotes a positive screen (funds select firms based on relative criteria). 
 
Categories Type Screens Definitions 
Sin N Tobacco Avoiding manufacturers of tobacco products 
 N Alcohol Avoiding producers of alcoholic beverages 
 N Gambling Avoiding casinos and suppliers of gambling equipment 
 N Weapons  Avoiding firms producing weapons or firearms 
 N Pornography  Avoiding publishers of pornographic magazines or video 
tapes, or firms that provide adult-entertainment services  
Ethical  N Animal Test Avoiding firms providing animal-testing services or involved 
in intensive farming of animals 
 N Abortion  Avoiding providers of abortion and manufacturers of abortion 
drugs or insurance companies that pay for elective abortions 
 N Genetic Engineering Avoiding firms developing genetically-modified products 
 P Healthcare Selecting firms whose products improve human health 
 N Non-Marital Avoiding insurance companies providing coverage to non-
married couples 
 N Islamic Avoiding pork producers and commercial banks (Used by 
funds managed according to Islamic principles) 
Social P Business Practice Selecting firms emphasizing product safety and quality 
 P Corporate 
Governance 
Selecting firms demonstrating best practices related to board 
independence, executive compensation, or other governance 
issues 
 P Community  Selecting firms with an active involvement in local 
communities  
 P/N Diversity Selecting firms pursuing active policies in employing 
minorities, women, gays/lesbians, and/or disabled persons; or 
Avoiding firms discriminating on gender/race  
 P/N Labor Relations Selecting firms providing good workplace conditions, 
empowering employee and/or strong union relationships; or 
Avoiding firms with poor labor relations 
 P/N Human Rights Selecting firms with policies to protect human rights; or 
Avoiding firms with bad records on human rights issues  
 P/N Foreign Operations Selecting firms with human rights policies for foreign 
operations; or Avoiding firms employing child labor overseas 
or operating in countries with oppressive regimes 
Environmental P/N Environment Selecting firms with high environmental standards; or 
Avoiding firms with low environmental standards 
 P Renewable Energy Selecting firms producing power from renewable energy 
 N Nuclear Avoiding companies operating nuclear power plants 
Activism  
Policy 
SRI funds attempt to influence company actions through direct dialogue with management 
and/or voting at the annual general meetings 
In-House  
SRI Research 
Screening activity is based on in-house SRI research  
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Table 2: Cross-Sectional Characteristics of Equity SRI funds 
 
Panel A of Table 2 reports the number of funds, the number of fund families, the average and median age (years since 
funds’ inception), and the average and median assets under management (in million ) per fund for SRI funds around 
the world at the end of 2003. A fund family consists of the funds issued by the same financial institution. Panel B 

















Panel A: Sample of SRI funds by country 
(1) Europe (excluding UK)       
Austria 16 6 2.0 1.6 3.4 2.7 54 
Belgium 18 5 3.6 3.0 24.4 9.1 438 
France 55 32 3.9 3.3 22.7 10.3 1250 
Germany 2 2 8.0 8.0 51.5 51.5 103 
Ireland 9 6 4.3 2.8 5.5 1.5 50 
Italy 7 7 4.4 1.8 83.1 9.8 582 
Luxemburg 55 29 4.6 3.4 41.3 11.0 2273 
Netherlands 13 9 4.0 3.4 61.3 20.5 797 
Sweden 3 2 7.6 8.9 33.5 7.6 100 
Switzerland 4 2 3.6 3.4 45.1 29.2 180 
Total 182 100 4.1 3.1 32.0 8.8 5828 
(2) US        
US 93 32 8.0 6.7 142.1 17.9 13211 
(3) UK        
UK 49 21 9.2 7.5 100.7 49.8 4932 
Isle of Man 2 1 3.8 3.8 2.4 2.4 5 
Guernsey 1 1 9.5 9.5 27.8 27.8 28 
Total 52 23 9.0 7.2 95.5 48.4 4964 
(4) Rest of the World        
Australia 36 11 5.2 2.8 7.9 1.7 285 
Cayman Islands 1 1 3.8 3.8 2.4 2.4 2 
Japan 13 10 5.0 4.2 42.8 24.8 556 
Malaysia 26 19 6.2 2.4 42.6 22.9 1109 
NL Antilles 1 1 6.0 6.0 119.0 119.0 119 
Singapore 2 2 3.9 3.9 0.7 0.7 1 
South Africa 4 3 5.0 3.1 28.2 14.4 113 
Total 83 47 5.4 2.8 26.3 6.9 2186 
        
Panel B: Sample of SRI funds and non-SRI funds 
SRI (World) 410 202 5.9 4.0 63.9 14.1 26189 




Table 3: Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A of Table 3 reports the average and standard deviation of money-flows, the returns, the flow volatility 
(measured in 12-month rolling windows), the risk (the standard deviation of returns in 12-month rolling 
windows), the fund size (the natural logarithm of fund assets in ), the total fees (the sum of the annual 
management fee and one seventh of the load fees) expressed as a percentage of the money invested, the 
number of funds per fund family, the fraction of funds investing in particular geographical areas (domestic, 
European or global), and the number of SRI screens used per fund over our sample period 1992–2003. The 
statistics are computed over time and across funds. Panel B reports the same statistics for all SRI and non-SRI 
funds in our sample. Panel C shows the average number of screens used per fund, the average number of 
negative or positive screens used, the average number of sin, ethical, social and environmental screens used. 
Furthermore, it reports the fraction of the funds that use negative, positive, sin, ethical, social, environmental or 
Islamic screens, and of those engaging in activism or basing their screening activity on in-house research.  
 
 
Panel A: SRI Funds By Region 
  Europe ex. UK US UK Rest of World 
Variable Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. 
Flow 0.028 0.142 0.036 0.145 0.027 0.140 0.030 0.160 
Return -0.006 0.060 0.001 0.057 -0.001 0.049 0.002 0.048 
Flow Volatility 0.088 0.109 0.071 0.123 0.070 0.120 0.089 0.132 
Size 2.454 1.664 3.111 1.934 3.784 1.509 1.610 2.888 
Risk 0.057 0.020 0.053 0.023 0.047 0.016 0.042 0.022 
Total Fees 0.017 0.006 0.019 0.008 0.018 0.006 0.021 0.006 
Management Fees 0.013 0.005 0.016 0.007 0.013 0.004 0.015 0.005 
Load Fees 0.028 0.020 0.018 0.024 0.035 0.022 0.040 0.027 
Number of Funds in Family 3.443 3.293 6.161 6.038 3.788 3.244 3.530 3.240 
D European Diversification 0.328 0.471 0.000 0.000 0.038 0.194 0.000 0.000 
D Global Diversification 0.607 0.490 0.161 0.370 0.404 0.495 0.169 0.377 
D Domestic investment 0.066 0.248 0.839 0.370 0.558 0.502 0.831 0.377 
Number of Screens 6.623 3.973 8.140 4.560 9.519 4.128 5.590 2.692 
 
Panel B: SRI and Non-SRI Funds 
  SRI (Overall) Non-SRI (UK) 
Variable Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. 
Flow 0.035 0.162 0.016 0.117 
Return 0.000 0.054 0.005 0.055 
Flow Volatility 0.079 0.121 0.064 0.087 
Size 2.601 2.214 4.182 1.569 
Risk 0.050 0.022 0.049 0.018 
Total Fees 0.018 0.007 0.018 0.006 
Management Fees 0.014 0.005 0.013 0.004 
Load Fees 0.029 0.024 0.039 0.019 
Number of Funds in Family 4.119 4.200 10.119 7.088 
D European Diversification 0.151 0.358 0.026 0.160 
D Global Diversification 0.392 0.489 0.536 0.499 
D Domestic Investment 0.457 0.499 0.438 0.500 
Number of Screens 7.124 4.098 N/A N/A 
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(Table 3 – Continued)  
 
Panel C: Screening Activity by SRI Funds 
 
Europe ex. 
UK US UK 
Rest of 
World Overall 
By fund: Average number of       
Screens 6.62 8.14 9.52 5.59 7.12 
Negative screens 3.00 4.55 5.85 3.51 3.81 
Positive screens 3.62 3.59 3.67 2.08 3.31 
Sin screens 1.73 3.31 3.60 2.69 2.52 
Ethical screens 0.56 0.67 1.40 0.53 0.68 
Social screens 2.70 2.71 2.62 1.49 2.45 
Environmental screens 1.63 1.45 1.90 0.88 1.47 
Fraction of funds with       
Negative screens 0.56 0.97 0.85 0.72 0.72 
Positive screens 0.92 0.69 0.87 0.58 0.79 
Sin screens 0.54 0.92 0.85 0.67 0.69 
Ethical screens 0.38 0.57 0.85 0.52 0.51 
Social screens 0.78 0.68 0.85 0.47 0.70 
Environmental screens 0.88 0.72 0.94 0.60 0.80 
Islamic screens 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.36 0.09 
Activism policy 0.18 0.47 0.31 0.06 0.24 





Table 4: Money-Flows and Past Performance 
 
This table presents the OLS estimates of the relation between money-flows and past performance (Equation 
(2)) for SRI funds (Panel A) and Non-SRI funds in the UK (Panel B). The dependent variable is the money-
flow of fund i in month t (Flowi,t) as by Equation (1). The independent variables include: the average returns of 
fund i over the months t-1 to t-12 and t-13 to t-24 (Average Returni,[t-1,t-12] and Average Returni,[t-13,t-24] ), 
interaction variables of the average returns and indicator variables that are equal to 1 if Average Return i,[t-1,t-12] 
and Average Return i,[t-13,t-24] are negative (D(Negative Return i,[t-1,t-12]) and D(Negative Return i,[t-13,t-24])). Size is 
measured as the natural logarithm of AUM in  (Sizei,t-1). The total risk is the Std. Dev. of monthly fund returns 
(Riski,t-1)). Age is the number of years (Agei,t-1). We also include an interaction term of age and a dummy 
equalling 1 if the age is below the median of all SRI (or conventional) funds in its domicile (Agei,t-1* 
D(Youngi,t-1 )). Total Feesi is the sum of the annual management fee and 1/7
th of the sum of front- and the back-
end load fees. We also include an interaction term of total fees and an dummy equalling 1 if the total fees are 
above the median total fees of all funds in the domicile (Total Feesi *D(High Feesi)). The money-flow in 
month t-1 is Flowi,t-1. D(Top Performer Familyi,t-1)  equals 1 if the raw returns of at least one SRI (or 
conventional) fund in the funds’ family belongs to the top 20% of all funds in its domicile. Number Funds 
Familyi, t-, is the number of SRI (or conventional) funds managed by the funds’ family, D(Market Leader 
Familyi,t-1) equals 1 if the funds’ family has the highest market share in its domicile, D(European 
Diversificationi) and D(Global Diversificationi) equal 1 if the fund invests across Europe or Globally. Number 
of Screensi is the number of SRI screens employed and 4 dummies equal 1 if the fund uses at least 1 of the 
main SRI screens (D(Sin Screensi),D(Ethical Screensi),D(Social Screensi) and D(Environmental 
Screensi)).D(Islamic Fundi) captures whether the fund is designed for Islamic investors, D(Activism Policyi) 
equals 1 if the fund aims at actively influencing corporate behaviour, D(In-House SRI Researchi) equals 1 if 
the fund has in-house SRI research. We include dummies based on the domicile of the fund (D(Europe ex. 
UKi), D(USi) and D(Rest of Worldi)), and 9 year dummies and 11 month dummies. Note that the coefficients on 
indicator variables (denoted with a prefix “D”) and the count variables (i.e. Constant, Age, Age *D Young, 
Number of Funds and Number of Screens) are multiplied by 100. The t-statistics are in Italics, calculated with 
White standard errors to account for heterogeneity. Bold coefficients indicate a significance level of at least 
5%.  
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(Table 4 – Continued) 
 
  Panel A: SRI  Panel B: Non-SRI 
Dependent variable  Money-Flow Money-Flow 
 Constant 1.912 2.378 3.999 5.352 
Past Performance Average Return (t-1, t-12) 0.948 7.279 0.776 7.460 
 Average Return (t-1, t-12) *  
D Negative Return (t-1, t-12) -0.746 -4.269 -0.461 -3.031 
 Average Return (t-13, t-24) 0.598 4.278 0.228 3.040 
 Average Return (t-13, t-24) *  
D Negative Return (t-13, t-24) -0.514 -2.752 0.108 0.725 
Fund Characteristics Size (t-1) -0.003 -5.040 -0.003 -5.098 
 Risk (t-1,t-12)i 0.068 1.214 0.172 2.754 
 Age (t-1) -0.048 -3.536 -0.033 -4.484 
 Age (t-1) * D Young (t-1) 0.099 1.436 -0.015 -0.611 
 Total Fees 0.381 1.378 -0.897 -3.795 
 Total Fees * D High Fees -0.470 -3.061 0.332 4.020 
Past Flows Flow (t-1) -0.009 -0.804 -0.122 -6.914 
Fund Family D Top Performer Family (t-1) 0.348 1.492 0.306 2.020 
 Number Funds in Family (t-1) 0.060 2.143 0.040 1.776 
 D Market Leader Family (t-1) -0.220 -0.855 0.594 1.731 
International Diversification D European Diversification 0.985 1.634 -0.685 -1.690 
 D Global Diversification 0.169 0.641 -0.478 -3.266 
Screening Activity Number of Screens 0.124 3.128   
 D Sin Screens 0.572 1.520   
 D Ethical Screens -1.011 -3.675   
 D Social Screens -0.288 -1.125   
 D Environmental Screens -0.930 -3.353   
 D Islamic Fund 0.365 0.765   
 D Activism Policy -0.506 -1.906   
 D In-House SRI Research 0.331 1.468   
Geographical Location D Europe (ex. UK) -1.023 -2.598   
 D US -0.872 -2.181   
 D Rest of World -1.658 -3.371   
Time Effect D Year Yes  Yes  
 D Month Yes  Yes  
 Adjusted R2 / F-statistics 0.021  7.873 0.029 22.110 
 Observations 15364  24105  
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Table 5: Flows and Past Relative Performance  
 
This table presents the OLS estimates of the relation between fund flows and past relative performance 
(Equation (3)) for SRI funds (Panel A) and Non-SRI funds(Panel B). The dependent variable is the money-
flow of fund i in month t, Flowi,t, defined as the net change of fund assets beyond reinvested dividends 
(Equation (1)). The independent variables include lagged fractional rank quintiles (Rank Bottom Quintile, Rank 
Middle Quintile and Rank Top Quintile). The calculation of these rank quintiles is given in Section III. Other 
independent variables are defined in Table 4. The coefficients of the indicator variables (denoted with a prefix 
“D”) and count variables (i.e. Constant, Age, Age *D Young, Number of Funds and Number of Screens) have 
been multiplied by 100. T-statistics are in Italics and are calculated with White standard errors to account for 
heterogeneity. Bold coefficients indicate a significance level of at least 5%.  
 
  Panel A: SRI  Panel B: Non-SRI 
Dependent variable  Money-Flow Money-Flow 
 Constant 0.266 0.277 4.845 5.568 
Relative Past Performance Rank Bottom Quintile (t-1, t-12) 0.028 1.261 -0.012 -0.711 
 Rank Middle Quintile (t-1, t-12) 0.021 4.154 0.019 4.524 
 Rank Top Quintile (t-1, t-12) 0.108 3.193 0.098 4.626 
 Rank Bottom Quintile (t-13, t-24) 0.024 1.104 0.017 0.872 
 Rank Middle Quintile (t-13, t-24) 0.018 3.530 0.010 2.454 
 Rank Top Quintile (t-13, t-24) 0.064 1.744 0.029 1.763 
Fund Characteristics Size (t-1) -0.003 -5.165 -0.003 -4.855 
 Risk (t-1,t-12) 0.056 1.198 0.050 0.855 
 Age (t-1) -0.040 -2.823 -0.032 -4.307 
 Age (t-1) * D Young (t-1) 0.118 1.732 -0.014 -0.593 
 Total Fees 0.455 1.623 -0.928 -3.894 
 Total Fees * D High Fees -0.500 -3.213 0.338 4.097 
Past Flows Flow (t-1) -0.010 -0.837 -0.123 -6.921 
Fund Family D Top Performer Family (t-1) -0.254 -0.985 0.134 0.889 
 Number Funds in Family (t-1) 0.092 3.081 0.049 2.160 
 D Market Leader Family (t-1) -0.290 -1.075 0.555 1.617 
International Diversification D European Diversification 1.055 1.728 -0.588 -1.442 
 D Global Diversification 0.370 1.350 -0.359 -2.447 
Screening Activity Number of Screens 0.104 2.569   
 D Sin Screens 0.555 1.443   
 D Ethical Screens -0.917 -3.254   
 D Social Screens 0.010 0.039   
 D Environmental Screens -0.947 -3.437   
 D Islamic Fund 0.779 1.607   
 D Activism Policy -0.668 -2.484   
 D In-House SRI Research 0.350 1.552   
Geographical Location D Europe (ex. UK) -0.970 -2.423   
 D US -0.819 -2.004   
 D Rest of World -1.656 -3.309   
Time Effect D Year Yes  Yes  
 D Month Yes  Yes  
 Adjusted R2 / F-statistics 0.022 8.024 0.029 21.195 
 Observations 15110  24105  
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Table 6: Money-Flows and Persistence in Past Performance 
 
This table presents the OLS estimates of the relationship between fund flows and persistence in past 
performance (Equation (4)) for SRI funds (Panel A) and non-SRI funds in the UK (Panel B). The dependent 
variable is the money-flows of fund i in month t, Flowi,t, defined as the net change of assets beyond reinvested 
dividends (Equation (1)). The independent variables include an indicator variable which equals 1 if fund i is a 
‘return winner’ for both the period from t-1 to t-12 and the period from t-13 to t-24 and zero otherwise 
(D(Persistent Winner i, [t-1,t-24])), where a winner is a fund whose average return over month t-1 to month t-12 is 
higher than the average return of the median fund in the domicile. D(Persistent Loser i, [t-1,t-24]) is an indicator 
variable that equals one if fund i is a loser for both the periods from t-1 to t-12 and from t-13 to t-24 and zero 
otherwise, and D(Loser to Winner i, [t-1,t-24]) is an indicator variable that equals one if fund i is a winner over the 
period from t-1 to t-12 and a loser from t-13 to t-24 and zero otherwise. Other independent variables are 
defined in Table 4. The coefficients of the indicator variables (denoted with a prefix “D”) and count variables 
(i.e. Constant, Age, Age *D Young, Number of Funds and Number of Screens) have been multiplied by 100. 
The t-statistics are in Italics, calculated with White standard errors to account for heterogeneity. Bold 
coefficients denote a significance level of at least 5%. 
 
  Panel A: SRI Panel B: Non-SRI 
Dependent variable  Money-Flow Money-Flow 
 Constant 2.932 3.845 5.614 7.621 
Performance Persistence D Persistent Winner (t-1, t-24) 0.782 3.098 1.081 5.233 
 D Persistent Loser (t-1, t-24) -1.601 -6.932 -0.814 -4.119 
 D Loser to Winner (t-1, t-24) -0.195 -0.720 -0.595 -3.245 
Fund Characteristics Size (t-1) -0.003 -4.668 -0.003 -4.851 
 Risk (t-1,t-12) 0.052 1.132 0.098 1.747 
 Age (t-1) -0.045 -3.324 -0.032 -4.240 
 Age (t-1) * D Young (t-1) 0.117 1.710 -0.012 -0.487 
 Total Fees 0.419 1.503 -0.870 -3.684 
 Total Fees * D High Fees -0.469 -3.036 0.359 4.319 
Past Flows Flow (t-1) -0.009 -0.774 -0.121 -6.832 
Fund Family D Top Performer Family (t-1) 0.282 1.212 0.320 2.120 
 Number Funds in Family (t-1) 0.054 1.883 0.037 1.625 
 D Market Leader Family (t-1) -0.193 -0.734 0.604 1.762 
International Diversification D European Diversification 0.958 1.598 -0.422 -1.028 
 D Global Diversification 0.253 0.934 -0.266 -1.829 
Screening Activity Number of Screens 0.114 2.823   
 D Sin Screens 0.476 1.257   
 D Ethical Screens -0.723 -2.647   
 D Social Screens -0.070 -0.272   
 D Environmental Screens -1.003 -3.659   
 D Islamic Fund 0.650 1.361   
 D Activism Policy -0.603 -2.244   
 D In-House SRI Research 0.431 1.915   
Geographical Location D Europe (ex. UK) -0.970 -2.421   
 D US -0.710 -1.767   
 D Rest of World -1.754 -3.552   
Time Effect D Year Yes  Yes  
 D Month Yes  Yes  
 Adjusted R2 / F-statistics 0.021 7.999 0.027 21.749 
 Observations 15291  24105  
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Table 7: Determinants of Flow Volatility 
 
This table presents the OLS estimates of the determinants of flow volatility (Equation (5)) for SRI funds (Panel 
A) and Non-SRI funds in the UK (Panel B). The dependent variable is the standard deviation of monthly 
money-flows of fund i over months t to t-11 (Flow Volatility I,[t,t-11]). The independent variables have been 
defined in Table 4. Note that the coefficients on indicator variables (denoted with a prefix “D”) and the count 
variables (i.e. Constant, Age, Age *D Young, Number of Funds and Number of Screens) have been multiplied 
by 100. The t-statistics are in Italics, calculated with White standard errors to account for heterogeneity. Bold 
coefficients indicate a significance level of at least 5%. 
 
  Panel A: SRI Panel B: Non-SRI 
Dependent variable  Flow Volatility Flow Volatility 
 Constant 7.412 10.831 9.205 18.110 
Past Performance Average Return (t-12, t-23) 0.789 6.654 0.368 5.250 
 Average Return (t-12, t-23) *  
D Negative Return (t-12, t-23) -0.211 -1.273 -0.811 -7.026 
Fund Characteristics Size (t-12) -0.008 -12.584 -0.009 -17.951 
 Risk (t-12) 0.330 7.591 0.120 2.693 
 Age (t-12) -0.096 -8.045 -0.042 -6.786 
 Age (t-12) * D Young (t-12) -0.077 -1.362 -0.036 -1.915 
 Total Fees 0.381 1.597 -0.045 -0.266 
 Total Fees * D High Fees -0.696 -5.463 0.321 4.924 
Past Flows Average Flow (t-12,t-23) 0.034 3.235 0.177 8.211 
Fund Family D Top Performer Family (t-12) 0.421 2.142 0.716 5.631 
 Number Funds in Family (t-12) 0.057 2.196 0.169 8.838 
 D Market Leader Family (t-12) 0.907 3.258 2.098 7.704 
International Diversification D European Diversification 2.068 4.751 -1.031 -3.098 
 D Global Diversification -0.538 -2.259 -0.086 -0.668 
Screening Activity Number of Screens 0.175 5.093   
 D Sin Screens -0.139 -0.466   
 D Ethical Screens -1.446 -6.795   
 D Social Screens -0.059 -0.279   
 D Environmental Screens -0.786 -3.670   
 D Islamic Fund 0.099 0.265   
 D Activism Policy -1.356 -5.682   
 D In-House SRI Research -0.559 -3.145   
Geographical Location D Europe (ex. UK) -0.709 -1.957    
 D US -2.299 -6.592   
 D Rest of World -2.028 -4.317   
Time Effect D Year Yes  Yes  
 D Month Yes  Yes  
 Adjusted R2 / F-statistics 0.088 31.216 0.094 67.582 
 Observations 14043  21870  
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Table 8: Money-Flows and Future Returns 
 
This table presents the OLS estimates of the relationship between future returns and past money-flows 
(Equation (6)) for SRI funds (Panel A) and Non-SRI funds in the UK (Panel B). The dependent variables are 
the raw return of fund i in month t (Returni,t), and the Abnormal Return. The independent variables have been 
defined in Table 4. The coefficients on indicator variables (denoted with a prefix “D”) and the count variables 
(i.e. Constant, Age, Age *D Young, Number of Funds and Number of Screens) have been multiplied by 100. 
The t-statistics are in Italics, calculated with White standard errors to account for heterogeneity. Bold 
coefficients indicate a significance level of at least 5%. 
 
 
  Panel A: SRI Panel B: Non SRI 
Dependent variable  Raw Return Abnormal Return Raw Return Abnormal Return 
 Constant -0.413 -1.208 -0.723 -2.155 0.001 -0.001 -0.497 -1.706 
Past Flows  Average Flow (t-1, t-12) -0.011 -1.890 -0.012 -1.995 -0.012 -0.533 -0.001 -0.043 
Fund Characteristics Size (t-1) -0.001 -2.519 -0.001 -2.254 -0.001 -4.622 -0.001 -4.346 
 Size (t-1)*Average Flow (t-1,t-12) 0.002 0.699 0.002 1.026 0.000 0.024 -0.001 -0.236 
 Risk (t-1,t-12) -0.082 -2.656 -0.108 -3.529 -0.038 -1.249 -0.046 -1.516 
 Age (t-1) -0.002 -0.260 -0.003 -0.348 0.002 0.696 0.002 0.707 
 Age (t-1) * D Young (t-1) 0.020 0.671 0.022 0.742 0.003 0.240 0.002 0.143 
 Total Fees 0.008 0.079 0.028 0.266 -0.052 -0.578 -0.042 -0.463 
 Total Fees * D High Fees -0.077 -1.271 -0.089 -1.485 0.105 2.817 0.104 2.772 
Past Performance Average Return (t-1, t-12) 0.074 2.056 -0.025 -0.696 0.023 0.833 -0.042 -1.513 
Fund Family D Top Performer Family (t-1) 0.191 2.239 0.283 3.336 0.098 1.347 0.140 1.917 
 Number Funds in Family (t-1) -0.013 -1.139 -0.019 -1.753 0.003 0.310 -0.001 -0.052 
 D Market Leader Family (t-1) 0.185 1.606 0.198 1.732 0.039 0.294 0.053 0.398 
Internat. Diversification D European Diversification -0.086 -0.461 -0.130 -0.704 0.006 0.031 0.013 0.064 
 D Global Diversification -0.112 -1.116 -0.139 -1.397 -0.345 -5.528 -0.342 -5.452 
Screening Activity Number of Screens 0.042 2.101 0.046 2.320     
 D Sin Screens -0.159 -1.201 -0.237 -1.788     
 D Ethical Screens -0.039 -0.341 -0.019 -0.172     
 D Social Screens -0.111 -0.884 -0.166 -1.337     
 D Environmental Screens -0.271 -1.934 -0.257 -1.840     
 D Islamic Fund 0.058 0.273 0.048 0.229     
 D Activism Policy -0.009 -0.082 -0.004 -0.035     
 D In-House SRI Research 0.072 0.769 0.093 0.988     
Geographical Location D Europe (ex. UK) -0.277 -1.930 -0.164 -1.157     
 D US 0.104 0.740 0.223 1.608     
 D Rest of World -0.042 -0.267 0.036 0.232     
Time Effect D Year Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
 D Month Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
 Adjusted R2 / F-statistics 0.184 93.817 0.175 88.292 0.187 188.630 0.172 170.560 
 Observations 18516  18488  27692  27663  
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Table 9: Money-Flows and Persistence in Future Returns 
 
This table presents the Probit estimates of the relationship between persistent in future returns and past flows 
(Equations (8) and (9)). The dependent variable for Panels A and C is an indicator variable equalling one if 
fund i is a winner for both the periods from t-1 to t-12 and from t-13 to t-24, and zero otherwise (D(Persistent 
Winner i, [t-1,t-24])), where a winner is defined in Table 6. The dependent variable for Panels B and D is 
D(Persistent Loser i, [t-1,t-24]), an indicator variable that equals one if fund i is a loser for both the periods from t-
1 to t-12 and from t-13 to t-24, and zero otherwise. The independent variables have been defined in Table 4. 
The coefficients on continuous independent variables (i.e. Average Flow, Size, Risk, Total Fees, Total Fees* D 
Young, and Average Return) have been divided by 100. The t-statistics are in Italics, calculated with White 
standard errors to account for heterogeneity. Bold coefficients indicate a significance level of at least 5%. 
 
  Panel A: SRI Panel B: SRI Panel C: Non-SRI Panel D: Non-SRI 
Dependent variable  Persistent Winner Persistent Loser Persistent Winner Persistent Loser 
 Constant 0.322 2.186 -1.886 -12.337 0.429 4.020 -1.045 -9.842 
Past Flows  Average Flow (t-24, t-35) -0.005 -2.127 0.007 2.924 -0.013 -4.609 0.009 3.469 
Fund Characteristics Size (t-24) -0.001 -7.347 0.001 7.147 -0.001 -12.206 0.001 11.572 
 Risk (t-24) -0.001 -1.131 0.001 1.446 -0.082 -10.076 0.009 1.146 
 Age (t-24) -0.072 -9.043 0.072 9.633 -0.001 -0.660 0.002 1.499 
 Age (t-24) * D Young (t-24) -0.004 -1.499 0.011 4.391 -0.016 -4.771 0.012 3.700 
 Total Fees 0.003 0.233 -0.020 -1.619 -0.082 -2.407 0.079 2.271 
 Total Fees * D High Fees -0.173 -4.227 0.103 2.323 0.080 6.247 -0.025 -1.941 
Past Performance Average Return (t-24, t-35) -0.057 -2.493 0.098 4.064 -0.049 -6.252 0.077 10.439 
Fund Family D Top Performer Family (t-24) -0.007 -0.644 0.008 0.778 0.078 3.084 -0.140 -5.547 
 Number Funds in Family (t-24) 0.067 2.077 -0.051 -1.491 0.015 4.299 -0.011 -2.973 
 D Market Leader Family (t-24) 0.008 2.088 -0.006 -1.299 0.063 1.554 -0.073 -1.769 
Internat. Diversification D European Diversification 0.128 3.075 -0.018 -0.408 -0.001 -0.018 0.055 0.727 
 D Global Diversification -0.691 -7.853 0.245 2.764 -0.390 -15.986 0.574 22.782 
Screening Activity Number of Screens -0.425 -9.967 0.276 6.464     
 D Sin Screens 0.051 6.347 -0.064 -7.805     
 D Ethical Screens -0.253 -4.699 0.245 4.424     
 D Social Screens -0.227 -5.127 0.355 8.068     
 D Environmental Screens -0.113 -2.459 0.163 3.479     
 D Islamic Fund -0.190 -3.699 0.267 5.012     
 D Activism Policy 0.127 1.608 -0.257 -3.142     
 D In-House SRI Research -0.105 -2.477 0.098 2.199     
Geographical Location D Europe (ex. UK) 0.148 2.415 0.080 1.260     
 D US -0.173 -3.095 0.174 3.060     
 D Rest of World -0.091 -1.366 0.161 2.305     
Time Effect D Year Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
 D Month Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
 MF R2 /Likelihood Ratio 0.064 815.470 0.066 757.100 0.057 1251.9 0.062 1356.1 






    Figure 1: Growth of the SRI fund Industry 
 
The figure shows the year-end number of funds and assets under management (in  million) of the SRI fund 
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Figure 2: Flows and Lagged Returns 
    
The figure shows the annual net flows (Flow) and the one-year-lagged annual returns (LagRet) of SRI funds in 
Europe (excluding the UK), the US, the UK and the Rest of the World.  
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Appendix: Summary of Economic Effects 
 
This table summarizes the economic effects of a standardized change (e.g. a change of one percent, an event (a 
dummy variable of 1), or a change of one standard deviation (1 S.D.)) in the explanatory variables in Tables 4-
9.  
 
Panel A: Determinants of money-flows (Tables 4-6) 
 Expected Sign 
Event  
Size 
Impact on money-flows 
(per month) 
Impact on money-flows 
(per annum) 
   SRI Non-SRI SRI Non-SRI 
Past Performance       
Average Return Positive + 1% 0.95% 0.78% 11.4% 9.3% 
Average Return Negative + 1% 0.20% 0.31% 2.4% 3.7% 
Rank Top Quintile + 10% 1.08% 0.98% 13.3% 11.8% 
Rank Bottom Quintile + 10% 0 0 0 0 
D Persistent Winner + 1 0.78% 1.08% 9.4% 13.0% 
D Persistent Loser - 1 -1.60% -0.81% -19.2% -9.7% 
Fund Characteristics       
Size - 1 S.D. (2.2) -0.66% -0.66% -7.9% -7.9% 
Risk - 1 S.D. (2.2%) 0 0.37% 0 4.5% 
Age - 1 S.D. (5.3) -0.25% -0.17% -3.0% -2.1% 
Total Fees Low - 1% 0 -0.90% 0 -10.8% 
Total Fees High - 1% 0 -0.57% 0 -6.8% 
Past Flows       
Average Flow  1% 0 -0.12% 0 -1.4% 
Fund Family       
D Top Performer Family + 1 0 0.31% 0 3.7% 
Number Funds in Family + 1 S.D. (4.2) 0.30% 0.17% 3.6% 2.1% 
D Market Leader Family  1 0 0 0 0 
Int. Diversification       
D European Diversification  1 0 0 0 0 
D Global Diversification  1 0 -0.48% 0 -5.8% 
Screening Activity       
Number of Screens  1 S.D. (4.1) 0.51%  6.1%  
D Sin Screens  1 0  0  
D Ethical Screens  1 -1.01%  -12.0%  
D Social Screens  1   0  
D Environmental Screens  1 -0.93%  -11.1%  
D Islamic Fund  1 0  0  
D Activism Policy  1 -0.67%  -8.0%  
D In-House SRI Research  1 0  0  
Geographical Location       
D Europe (ex. UK)  1 -1.02%  -12.1%  
D US  1 -0.87%  -10.4%  
D Rest of World  1 -1.66%  -19.9%  
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(Appendix – Continued) 
 
Panel B: Determinants of flow volatility (Tables 7) 
 Expected Sign 
Event 
Size 
Impact on flows volatility 
(per month) 
Impact on flow volatility 
(per annum) 
   SRI Non-SRI SRI Non-SRI 
Past Performance       
Average Return Positive + 1% 0.79% 0.37% 9.5% 4.4% 
Average Return Negative + 1% 0.79% -0.45% 9.5% -5.4% 
Fund Characteristics       
Size - 1 S.D. (2.2) -1.76% -1.98% -21.1% -23.8% 
Risk + 1 S.D. (2.2%) 0.73% 0.26% 8.8% 3.1% 
Age - 1 S.D. (5.3) -0.51% -0.22% -6.1% -2.6% 
Total Fees Low - 1% 0 0 0 0 
Total Fees High - 1% -0.32% 0.28% -3.8% 3.4% 
Past Flows       
Average Flow  1% 0.03% 0.18% 0.4% 2.2% 
Fund Family       
D Top Performer Family + 1 0.42% 0.72% 5.0% 8.6% 
Number Funds in Family + 1 S.D. (4.2) 0.24% 0.71% 2.9% 8.5% 
D Market Leader Family  1 0.91% 2.10% 10.9% 25.2% 
Int. Diversification       
D European Diversification  1 2.07% -1.03% 24.8% -12.4% 
D Global Diversification  1 -0.54% 0 -6.5% 0 
Screening Activity       
Number of Screens  1 S.D. (4.1) 0.72%  8.6%  
D Sin Screens  1 0  0.0%  
D Ethical Screens  1 -1.45%  -17.4%  
D Social Screens  1 0  0  
D Environmental Screens  1 -0.79%  -9.5%  
D Islamic Fund  1 0  0  
D Activism Policy  1 -1.36%  -16.3%  
D In-House SRI Research  1 -0.56%  -6.7%  
Geographical Location       
D Europe (ex. UK)  1 -0.71%  -8.5%  
D US  1 -2.30%  -27.6%  
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Panel C: Determinants of abnormal returns and persistence (Tables 8-9) 
 Expected Sign 
Event 
Size 
Impact on abnormal 
returns (per month) 
Impact on abnormal 
returns (per annum) 
Impact on probability 
being a persist. winner 
   SRI Non-SRI SRI Non-SRI SRI Non-SRI 
Past Flows         
Average Flow - 1 S.D. (16%) -0.20% 0 -2.3% 0 -3% -6% 
Fund Characteristics         
Size - 1 S.D. (2.2) -0.22% -0.22% -2.6% -2.6% -7% -7% 
Risk - 1 S.D. (2.2%) -0.22% 0 -2.6% 0 0 -5% 
Age  1 S.D. (5.3) 0 0 0 0 -9% 0 
Total Fees Low - 1% 0 0 0 0 0 -2% 
Total Fees High - 1% 0 0.06% 0 0.72% -5% 0 
Past Performance         
Average Return  1% 0 0 0 0 -2% -2% 
Fund Family         
D Top Performer Family  1 0.28% 0 3.4% 0 0 2% 
Number Funds in Family  1 S.D. (4.2) 0 0 0 0 7% 2% 
D Market Leader Family  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Int. Diversification         
D European Diversification  1 0 0 0 0 1% 0 
D Global Diversification  1 0 -0.34% 0 -4.1% -3% -2% 
Screening Activity         
Number of Screens  1 S.D. (4.1) 0.19%  2.3%  -8%  
D Sin Screens  1 0  0  0  
D Ethical Screens  1 0  0  -2%  
D Social Screens  1 0  0  -2%  
D Environmental Screens  1 0  0  -1%  
D Islamic Fund  1 0  0  -1%  
D Activism Policy  1 0  0  0  
D In-House SRI Research  1 0  0  -1%  
Geographical Location         
D Europe (ex. UK)  1 0  0  1%  
D US  1 0  0  -1%  
D Rest of World  1 0  0  0  
 
 
